Op-ed by CHRO Executive Director Salai Za Uk Ling
The demand to free political prisoners in Myanmar is urgent, necessary, and morally undeniable. But it must also be said clearly, these individuals should never have been arrested in the first place.
Their detention is not a legal matter, it is an injustice.
Since the 2021 military coup, the scale of repression has been staggering. According to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, as of April 10, 2026, at least 30,870 people have been arrested, with 22,170 still detained, including those sentenced.
Thousands have been killed, while only a fraction have been released.
These figures expose a brutal reality. Arrest, detention, torture, and killing are not isolated acts, they are part of a systematic campaign to silence dissent and control a population.
Yet amid this ongoing crisis, the Myanmar military has learned to manipulate the narrative. The release of political prisoners, long demanded by the international community, is increasingly used as a calculated political tool.
Amnesties are timed, releases are staged, headlines are shaped.
What follows is predictable. Some governments begin to interpret these gestures as signs of progress, calls for engagement grow, pressure eases, and the regime gains breathing space.
Governments must not interpret prisoner releases as a basis for re-engagement or normalization under any circumstances.
This is not reform; it is political theatre.
That theatre is now expanding. Following a deeply flawed electoral process, the military has sought to recast itself as a civilian authority, installing a military-dominated, civilian-clad administration since April 10.
This rebranding is part of a broader attempt to manufacture legitimacy while the structures of repression remain firmly in place.
The timing of prisoner releases must also be understood in this context. Another amnesty took place on Myanmar New Year, a symbolic moment traditionally associated with cleansing and renewal.
But political repression cannot be washed away through ritual, nor can legitimacy be manufactured through staged elections and timed releases.
President Win Myint was released. This move could be framed as a breakthrough, a powerful and symbolic gesture intended to signal change. But it would be a mistake to mistake symbolism for substance.
Any selective release, especially of prominent figures, must be understood as part of a broader strategy to secure political concessions, not evidence of systemic change.
The release of a few cannot mask the continued detention of thousands, nor the ongoing arrests that take place every day.
Even as some are released, new arrests continue daily, ensuring that the overall system of repression remains unchanged.
The demand must remain clear and uncompromising, release everyone, and dismantle the legal and political machinery that enables arbitrary arrest, including emergency provisions, military tribunals, and repressive laws used to criminalize dissent.
The fundamental truth must not be obscured, releasing political prisoners is not a concession. It is the bare minimum obligation of any authority that claims to uphold the rule of law.
A regime cannot claim credit for partially undoing violations it should never have committed. If this distinction is blurred, the consequences are serious.
Selective releases risk becoming a mechanism through which legitimacy is gradually rebuilt, while arrests continue, airstrikes intensify, and entire communities remain under attack. The system of repression remains intact, even as its image is carefully managed.
Without credible legal consequences, this cycle of arrest, release, and re-arrest will continue indefinitely.
This is where the conversation must shift, from gestures to consequences.
There is growing recognition within the United Nations system that universal jurisdiction is an essential pathway to justice in Myanmar.
At the Human Rights Council’s 61st session, multiple mandates and mechanisms underscored the importance of accountability efforts beyond Myanmar’s borders.
Importantly, this is no longer theoretical.
In the Philippines, a universal jurisdiction case has already been initiated against Myanmar military leaders.
In Timor-Leste, proceedings are moving forward. More recently, activists in Indonesia have filed a genocide complaint targeting Myanmar’s top leadership.
Taken together, these efforts reflect a growing regional willingness to confront impunity.
They also present the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) with a critical opportunity.
For years, ASEAN’s response has centered on the Five-Point Consensus. While it remains an important framework, it has been repeatedly ignored and selectively engaged by the Myanmar military.
Continued reliance on dialogue without consequence risks enabling the very abuses ASEAN seeks to resolve.
What has been missing is leverage.
Universal jurisdiction provides that leverage, not as a replacement for ASEAN’s consensus, but as a necessary complement to it. It introduces consequence into a process that has too often relied on persuasion alone.
This is a language the military understands.
For countries like the Philippines, particularly in its role as ASEAN 2026 Chair, this moment calls for principled leadership.
The Philippines has a responsibility to ensure that the region does not drift toward normalization based on staged prisoner releases and manufactured political transitions.
Supporting the unconditional release of all political prisoners remains essential, but it must be matched by a firm refusal to treat such gestures as reform.
Engagement must be grounded in measurable change, ending attacks on civilians, allowing humanitarian access, and advancing credible accountability.
Above all, clarity is needed.
Myanmar’s political prisoners are not bargaining chips. They are victims of a system that continues to operate with impunity.
They should never have been imprisoned. Their release is not progress, it is a correction of injustice.
The demand remains simple, free them all. It must be backed by consequence.
Salai Za Uk Ling is executive director of the Chin Human Rights Organization, a nongovernmental organization established in 1995 to protect civilians, document atrocity crimes, and advance justice for the Chin people and other ethnic communities in Myanmar. He has a pending war crimes complaint against top officials of the Myanmar junta before the Philippine Department of Justice under the international humanitarian law.