CHRO

By Lian H. Sakhong

Introduction

“Dialogue” in popular usage simply means “conversation or talk”. The original Greek word for “dialogue” meant “a form of literally expression in the form of a conversion between two or more people”. In Greek culture, dialogue was usually expressed in a “literary or philosophical work, written in the form of conversation”. One of such examples is the “Platonic Dialogue” which revealed the “antiquity, dignity and seriousness of the term dialogue and what it implied.” In fact, the word dialogue was one of the fundamental terms at the root of Greco-Roman world, Judeo-Christian traditions and Western cultures. Sakowicz, therefore, claims, “at the start of civilization there was conversation, and there was dialogue”

In today’s world, the concept of dialogue is no longer contained within Western civilization; it has become a global phenomenon within the civilization of humanity, a civilization without any boundaries between East and West, North and South. Dialogue challenged “religions and cultures to come out of security of their yards” in order to overcome distrust and to attain liberation from fear. It has challenged all kind of political doctrines which built “walls of prejudice” and created a culture of “monologue”.  The task of dialogue in such context is to “oppose any form of injustice” imposed upon society by dictators. In a democratic open society, on the other hand, dialogue between political powers is necessary for the normal functioning of a nation, since it keeps government from abusing its powers.

As Pope John Paul II teaches us, “society cannot give its citizens happiness which they expected from it, unless it is based on dialogue.”  Dialogue also enables one to understand the past as well as the future marked by a spirit of openness, and the “fruit of dialogue always is reconciliation between people.”

Dialogue in Burmese Political Context

In a new Burmese political culture, the term “dialogue” becomes the key word to express the nature of the democracy movement and the meaning of the freedom struggle, especially after 1994 when the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution, which called for a “Tripartite Dialogue”.

“Tripartite Dialogue” in Burmese political context means a negotiation amongst three parties: the military government known as “State Peace and Development Council” (SPDC), the 1990 election winning party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), and ethnic nationalities, the founding nations or national groups of the Union.

The essence of tripartite dialogue is “inclusiveness” and “recognition” which, in concepts, includes all the major political stakeholders, or conflict parties in Burma: military junta, democratic forces led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and ethnic nationalities. Moreover, the UN’s tripartite dialogue resolution recognizes the 1990 election results which have been denied by the military government for 14 years, and recognizes the indispensable participation of ethnic nationalities in the political transition and national reconciliation process in Burma.

The UN resolution also acknowledges the very nature of political crisis in Burma which, in conceptually speaking, is a “constitutional problem” rather than solely an ideological confrontation between democracy and military rule or totalitarianism. It is not a “minority” problem, or even an ethnic problem which some Burman or Myanmar   politicians argue can be solved later, once democracy is established. The question of democracy, military rule and the constitutional arrangement with special reference to the non-Myanmar (non-Burman) ethnic nationalities—comprising close to 40 percent of the total population—are intrinsically intertwined and cannot be solved one without the other. This is the meaning behind the call for a “tripartite dialogue”.

Ever since the United Nations General Assembly passed the resolution calling for a “tripartite dialogue” in 1994, “dialogue” has become the grand strategy of the democracy movement in Burma. However, this also raises the question of how does Burma’s “armed resistance movement” fit within the call for dialogue? Armed resistance has been the main strategy—a self-defence response, and in reaction to repression and atrocities—of ethnic nationalities of Burma in their struggle for self-determination and political equality which began some fifty years ago.

In this paper, I will argue that adopting dialogue as a “grand strategy” does not mean the rejection of armed struggle or “people’s power”, the latter being advocated so dearly by some elements of Burman/Myanmar politicians in exile. Both armed resistance and “people’s power” are still important but they now play different roles. The crucial point, however, is this: strategy may change as the changing situation demands, and the tactics may change in accordance with the changing internal and external politics but the ultimate goal shall not be changed until and unless the goal itself is achieved. A strategy is adopted in order to achieve a goal, and tactics are applied in order that the strategy works; but the changing strategy and tactics shall not affect the ultimate goal.

PART ONE: ULTIMATE GOAL

The Ultimate Goal of the Democracy Movement in Burma

What is the ultimate goal of democracy movement in Burma?

The answer to this question depends on how we analyse the nature of political crisis in Burma. How do we perceive and analyse the nature of Burma’s political crisis, and how do we intend to solve its problems? Should Burma be a unitary state or a federal union? How shall we deal with the problem of power sharing and division of powers between the central government and states? In short, how do we avoid the Burman/Myanmar domination and ethnic separation—which are two very crucial issues that has dominated and shaped politics in Burma, especially 1962? Are there any means to live peacefully together in this Union? If the answer is yes, then the next question is: how are we going to build a peaceful nation together?

Different actors answer this question differently, for their goals are fundamentally different in nature. For the military junta, the answer is “total domination”, even “ethnic Myanmar domination of Burma”. For them, politics is nothing but power—i.e. power as a means of “domination”. In their attempt to achieve their goal, they have opted for a strictly centralised government based on a unitary constitution, where the Armed Forces—dominated by the Burman segment— can play a central role in governing the state by, as they proposed at the National Convention in 1995, controlling 20 percent of the national parliament and as well state and divisional assemblies.

The politics of “ethnic domination” actually is not a new phenomenon in Burmese political culture; it has long been associated with Myanmar ethnic nationalism that emerged from within the Myanmar nationalist movements in the colonial period. As U Maung Maung observes in his book From Sangha to Laity: Nationalist Movement in Burma, 1920-1940, a main source of inspiration for the early Burman/Myanmar nationalist movement were religion oriented as illuminated in the creeds, such as, “Buda-Bata Myanmar-lu-myo” (To be a Myanmar is to be a Buddhist), in which Myanmar ethnicity and Buddhism were inseparably blended together. When Dobamaa Asi-Azone, one of the earliest anti-British national organization, was founded, ethnicity (Myanmar identity), religion (Buddhism) and language (Myanmar-sa, the language of the Myanmar or Burman) played the central role: Nationalism was conceived in terms of race and religion.

Aung San, however, challenged such ethno-religious brand of nationalism when he became Secretary General of Dobama Asi-Azone in 1938. He criticized the notion of religious-oriented traditional Burmese nationalism of “our race, our religion, our language”, which he said “have gone obsolete now”. And he clearly states “religion is a matter of individual conscience, while politics is social science. We must see to it that the individual enjoys his rights, including the right to freedom of religious belief and worship. We must draw clear lines between politics and religion because the two are not the same thing. If we mix religion with politics, then we offend the spirit of religion itself.”

Although Aung San claimed that the Dobama Asi-Azone was the “only non-racial, non-religious movement that has ever existed in Burma”, some elements of traditional nationalism, which blended Myanmar (Burman) ethno-nationalism with Buddhism remained, it being the founding principles of the organization when it was established in the 1930s, and this stream was represented by such prominent figures as Tun Ok and Ba Sein. Thus, while Aung San’s policy, defined by an inclusive radical secular approach, allowed a certain level of inclusiveness towards the non-Burman nationalities, this very same policy caused Dobama Asi-Azone to split into two factions in March 1938. A group opposed to Aung San’s policy of inclusion and secularism was led by Tun Ok and Ba Sein, and was thus known as the “Tun Ok–Ba Sein” faction. The remaining majority faction was led by Thakin Kodaw Hmaing and Aung San. Although each claimed to be Dobama Asi-Azone, “they were in reality two separate parties”.

While Kodaw Hmaing and Aung San opted for a “non-racial, non-religious secular approach”, Tun Ok and Ba Sein’s political convictions were centred on ethnicity and religion, namely the Myanmar ethnicity and the religion of Buddhism. Moreover, while the former pair advocated democracy and a Federal Union, Ba Sein and Tun Ok were in “favour of a totalitarian form of national polity,”   and declared that “totalitarianism would benefit Burma”.  They also “favoured the restoration of the monarchy”, an institution which was inseparably associated with the state religion of Buddhism.  Buddhism for them was not just a religion but a political ideology as well. Thus, they could not conceive of religion without a defender of the faith, i.e. the “king who appointed and ruled the Buddhist hierarchy”.  They proposed the revival of the monarchy as the best means of achieving independence.

As Tun Ok and Ba Sein had opted for the exclusion of non-Buddhists and non-Burman/Myanmar ethnicities, under such slogans as “one race, one blood, one voice,” and “a purer race, a purer religion and a purer language,”  they not only excluded non-Burman nationalities, such as the Chin, Kachin and Shan, they even ignored the existence of these nationalities and peoples. That was the reason why Ba Sein and his fellow U Saw refused to sign the “Aung San – Attlee Agreement” and rejected the result of the 1947 Panglong Agreement. And U Saw killed Aung San, who invited Chin, Kachin, Shan and other ethnic nationalities to join the Union of Burma as equal partners.

After Aung San’s assassination, Ba Sein and Tun Oke buried Aung San’s policy of pluralism, ethnic equality and the secular state.  The legacy of “Ba Sien – Tun Oke” which advocates the ethno-religious oriented Myanmar domination in Burma politics was kept alive by Ne Win and Aung Gyi in the 1950s and 1960s. It continues with the current military junta. In addition to General Ne Win and his military successors, there are elements who even now maintain that non-Myanmar ethnic nationalities claim for self-determination should be considered only after democracy is restored. For them “democracy is first, democracy is second, and democracy is third”: so, the non-Myanmar ethnic nationalities must “keep silent, follow the leaders, and obey the order”.

It seems that history is repeating itself. During the independence movement, the “Tun Oke – Ba Sein” faction of Myanmar nationalists claimed that “independence is first, independence is second, and independence is third” and they ignored non-Burman issues completely. In contrast, Aung San came to Panglong in 1947, and invited Chin, Kachin, Shan and other ethnic nationalities to jointly form the Union, a year prior to independence. In this way, Aung San created a political atmosphere in which all of Burma’s nationalities could feel that they were the founding members of the Union of Burma.

During the 1988 democracy uprising, while Aung Gyi and other leaders rejected ethnic nationalities demands for self-determination and federalism, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, like her father, met with non-Myanmar ethnic leaders, and a meeting at the UNLD office, on 15 July 1989, they agreed to work together for “democracy and to resolve the ethnic issues”. Thus, the position of Aung San Suu Kyi and ethnic nationalities was that the questions of “democracy and the ethnic issues” — which are inseparably linked with the “constitutional problems” — must be addressed together in order for democracy to be restored. They cannot be separated, for they hold the same value like the two sides of the same coin.

Currently, Myanmar ethnic politicians in exile say that “to solve these two problems [democracy and ethnic issues], we need different approaches.” Accordingly, they say: “we need to establish democracy in the country first.” They impatiently asks, “Why [can’t we] wait until we have democratic government? Why do we have to insist on addressing the ethnic issue under a repressive military regime rather than waiting to do so under a democratic [government]? Do the ethnic nationalities believe that demanding their rights under military rule is easier than under a democratic government?”

The main problem with such an argument is that they cannot definitely proclaim their ultimate goal, and the sort of democracy that they want to restore is unclear. For example, a former Burman student leader has said, “We already have the 1947 constitution, which guarantees democratic rights”. A counter question that may be posed in response is: do they want to restore the semi-unitary arrangement of the parliamentary democracy system of the 1950s? Democracy can be, as Tocqueville warned us a century ago, a “tyranny of majority” which only encourages the politics of “ethnicity and ethnic domination”.

For the non-Myanmar ethnic nationalities, though they want democracy, the typical Westminster-style majoritarian system of governance is simply not an option. They have had enough negative experiences of the tyranny of Westminster-style majoritarian rule during the so-called parliamentary democracy era of the 1950s and early 1960s under the 1947 Constitution, especially when the central government promulgated Buddhism as a state religion in 1961. For them, the only option is federalism with strong emphasis on self-determination, decentralization, and inclusive representative system of all the people at local, state and federal levels.

Similar to ethnic nationalities’ position, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi stand is that the current democracy movement is “the struggle for second independence”. In this way, she links current struggle for democracy with the first struggle for self-determination—for both of them are rooted in the “Spirit of Panglong” upon which the Union of Burma was founded at the first place. Under her leadership, the NLD (National League for Democracy) and UNLD (United Nationalities league for Democracy, an umbrella political organization of all the non-Myanmar or non-Burman political parties in Burma), issued a statement which read:

All nationalities shall have full rights of equality, racially as well as politically, and, in addition to having the full rights of self-determination, it is necessary to build a Union with a unity of all the nationalities which guarantees democracy and basic human rights.

Thus, we can conclude by saying that for the NLD under the leadership of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and ethnic nationalities, as represented by the UNLD, the ultimate goal of democracy movement is to establish a genuine federal union based on the principles of political equality for all member states of the union, the right of self-determination for all ethnic nationalities, and democratic rights for all citizens of the union. This policy has been adopted also by the ENSCC (Ethnic Nationalities Solidarity and Cooperation Committee) when they launched the policy of “The New Panglong Initiative: Re-building the Union of Burma” in 2001.

PART TWO: THE GRAND STRATEGY

Dialogue: Grand Strategy for Democracy Movement

As mentioned above, dialogue has become the grand strategy for Burma’s democracy movement since 1994. However, we must remember that “dialogue strategy” is derived from the notion of a non-violent struggle for democratic change, a concept advanced by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in 1988. “Dialogue strategy” cannot be separated from “non-violent movement” — for the two holds the same value together.

The purpose of “dialogue strategy” is not only to achieve the ultimate goal of the democracy movement, that is, to establish a genuine democratic federal union through a peaceful transition without bloodshed. It is believed that through dialogue competing interests can interact in a non-adversarial way. In countries like Burma that are or have been engaged in serious conflicts, dialogue can also act as a mechanism to help prevent, manage and resolve conflict:

•  As a mechanism for the prevention of conflict. By bringing various actors together for structured, critical and constructive discussions on the state of the nation, dialogue can result in a consensus on the reforms that are needed to avoid confrontation and conflict.

•  As a mechanism for the management of conflict. Dialogue can help put in place democratic institutions and procedures that can structure and set the limits of political conflicts. Democratic institutions and procedures provide mechanisms for political consultation and joint action that can peacefully manage potential conflicts.

•  As a mechanism for the resolution of conflict. Furthermore, political dialogue can defuse potential crises by proposing appropriate peaceful solutions. Democratic institutions and procedures provide a framework to sustain peace settlements and prevent the recurrence of conflict.

Likewise, the UNLD also adopted the non-violent strategy when it was formed in 1988, and they declared that “democracy is the only form of sustainable governance which guarantees for all members of various nationalities, both individually and collectively, the rights of full participation in their social, economic, and cultural development and as well the ownership of resources available to all citizens of the Union.”  Stable and enduring democracy therefore requires an active participation of all the citizensas an individual citizens and collective members of ethnic communitiesto build and renovate not only the democratic institutions but also the structure of the Union itself, which shall balance the different interests of nationalities for the common good of all member states of the Union.

Since they believe in democratic principles and the rights of full participation of all nationalities in the process of nation rebuilding, both ethnic nationalities and democratic forces in Burma demand dialogue as an integral part of political transition, not only in the process of power transformation (from a military-controlled and monopolized kind of power to a democratically ordered one), but which also includes the restructuring of the Union into a federal system. Therefore, in the processes of both power transformation and democratisation, dialogue must be the main instrument for bringing all individual citizens and collective members of ethnic nationalities of the Union together at all levels.

After the general election in 1990, it was generally accepted that at least three levels of dialogue might be necessary to achieve the goal of the creation of a democratic open society and the establishment of a genuine federal union.

The first step of dialogue is for a “breakthrough” which will break the stagnant political deadlock; and the second step, which is more important than the first level, will be not only for power transformation but also to find a solution to the entire political crisis and to end the civil war in Burma; and the third step will be concerned with the entire process of democratisation and the restructuring of the Union as a federal system.

Three levels of dialogue that will, in concepts, be needed are:
• Pre-negotiation Talk or Talk about Talk.
• Tripartite Dialogue (for power transformation/power sharing, and to lay the foundation of the future federal union).
• National Consultative Convention (for consolidating democratic federal system).

The First Level: Pre-negotiation Talk

At the first level, Pre-negotiation Talk is needed for the first contact between opposite parties (directly or through negotiator/mediator) to discuss the “process” of negotiation, without mentioning the “substance” or the “out comes”.

In any kind of negotiation for transition plan, there are always two components: the “process” and the “substance”. The “substance” is concerned with what the conflicting parties want to achieve? What kind of outcome do they want to see through this negotiation? What sort of political structure should be negotiated for during the “process”? In short this is the substance of the solution itself, or the goal of the struggle. “Process”, on the other hand, is the business of negotiation and dialogue, which focuses on the element of the solution, that is, how to reach a solution? Both are important: without the substance, process is worth nothing and without a good process the substance cannot be achieved.

Pre-negotiation Talk, therefore, is needed to set up the framework within which the “process of negotiation” is going to be designed. Thus, the “Pre-negotiation Talk” should be chiefly concerned with:

(i) Where and when the negotiation will take place (time and venue)?
(ii) How to choose the representatives: that is, who will participate in the process, and what shall be the method of representation?
(iii) Agreeing on basic rules and procedures;
(iv) Dealing with preconditions for negotiation and barriers to dialogue;
– A nation-wide ceasefire
– Freedom of assembly and meeting
– Free passage for non-ceasefire groups (for example!)
– Re-instatement of banned political parties
– Release political prisoners, especially Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.
(v) Communication and information exchange;
(vi) Managing the proceeding;
(vii) Time frames;
(viii) Decision-making procedures;
(ix) The possible assistance of a third part;
(x) Resource and financial assistance that will be needed during the negotiation, etc.

The Second Level: Tripartite Dialogue

As mentioned above, political crisis in Burma today is not just a conflict between totalitarianism and democracy. It involves a protracted civil war that has consumed many lives and much of the resources of the country for five decades. The root of civil war in Burma is the conflict over power arrangement between the central government, which so far has been controlled by one ethnic group called Myanmar or Burman, and all the non-Myanmar (or non-Burmman) ethnic groups in the Union. In other words, it is, as mentioned, a problem of constitution, or more specifically, the rights of self-determination for non-Burman nationalities who joined the Union as equal partners in 1947. Indeed, most nationalities in Burma are now fighting against the military monopolized central government for self-determination and autonomous status of their respective National States within the Union.

In order to avoid further bloodshed and violence during the political transition, the second level of dialogue must start almost simultaneously with the first level of dialogue. Dialogue at the second level shall be concerned not only with power transformation and sharing but also with solving the entire political crisis in Burma. It should end the five long decades of civil war by laying down the foundation of a genuine Federal Union. The non-Myanmar (non-Burman) ethnic nationalities’ position is that without a genuine Federal Union there is no means of ending the civil war in Burma. Without ending the civil war, there is no means of establishing a democratic system. Thus, the participation of all ethnic nationalities in the political transition is the most important element in the entire process of democratisation and restructuring of the Union into a federal system. Alternatively, it could be said that the tripartite dialogue will serve not only as a platform for power transformation but also as a means to end the civil war, which has consumed so many lives and national resources over the last five decades.

Thus, dialogue at that level must be a three ways negotiation, or a tri-partite dialogue, which shall include three forces, namely the forces composed of the non-Myanmar nationalities, the democratic forces led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and the military junta. To fulfil the demand for a tripartite dialogue, as called for by successive United Nations General Assembly resolutions since 1994, the participants must include in equal proportions the representatives of the 1990 election winning parties,  representatives of the SPDC, and representatives of ethnic nationalities.

The Third Level: National Consultative Convention

As a tripartite dialogue is needed for power transformation during the process of democratisation, another level of dialogue is needed for “consolidating” a democratic federal system and “ensuring” peace in Burma. That stage of dialogue can be called the “National Consultative Convention”.

In regards to this, the UNLD had adopted a policy of national convention at the conference held in Rangoon, on June 29 to July 2, 1990. At that conference, all the members of the UNLD unanimously adopted a policy of national convention that stated “in order to lay down the general guidelines of a federal constitution which will serve as the foundation on which to build a new democratic society for the future Federal Union, a National Consultative Convention shall be convened, similar to the Panglong Conference.”  

The UNLD consulted the issue of the National Consultative Convention with the NLD, the winner of the 1990 general election. On August 29, 1990, the UNLD and the NLD made a joint declaration known as Bo Aung Kyaw Street Declaration, which called for a “National Consultative Convention”.

Similar to the Bo Aung Kyaw Street Declaration (but within different political context due to fourteen years of political deadlock), the ENSCC called for the “Congress of National Unity” which will produce the “Government of National Unity”, when they produced the “Road Map for Re-building the Union of Burma” in the beginning of September 2003.

The ENSCC’s political “Road Map” stated: “in the spirit of Panglong, we are committed to national reconciliation and to the rebuilding of the Union as equal partners in the process. We believe that in order to establish a stable, peaceful and prosperous nation, the process of rebuilding the Union must be based on a democratic process which includes the following basic principles:

1. A peaceful resolution of the crisis in the Union,
2. The resolution of political problems through political dialogue,
3. Respect for the will of the people,
4. The recognition and protection of the rights of all citizens of the Union,
5. The recognition and protection of the identity, language, religion, and cultural rights of all nationalities,
6. The recognition and protection of the rights of the constituent states of the Union through a federal arrangement.”

In lines with above principles, the ENSCC’s political “road map” recommends “a two-stage process to generate confidence in the transition to democracy”: A Congress for National Unity (two year term) and Government of National Unity (four year term). The Congress for National Unity, which in fact is a “Tripartite Dialogue”, will draft a “National Accord”, according to which, the “Independent Constitution Drafting Commissions” (for the Federal Constitution and State Constitutions) and the “Government for National Unity” will be formed.

At a second stage of third level, the “Government of National Unity” will conduct “a referendum”, to be monitored by the international community to ensure that the will of the people is reflected in the new National Constitution.  Following a successful referendum on the new National Constitution, “general elections” monitored by the international community will be held to establish a democratic federal government at the end of the four years.

Some Obstacles to Negotiation and Dialogue Strategy

Since Burma’s democracy movement, under the leadership of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, has chosen dialogue as the main strategy; negotiation and compromise will become the methods that are employed to achieve the objectives of the struggle. It is clear from the onset that negotiations will undoubtedly require to compromise on many issues in order to achieve a peaceful settlement. Actually, in democratic culture, politics itself is a “process of compromise”. However, a successful negotiation can be defined as “compromise” without losing one’s position, compromise without sacrificing the “ultimate goal”.

The leaders of both democratic forces and ethnic nationalities should, therefore, mentally prepare for difficult and painful compromises at tripartite negotiation, in order to solve the political crisis in Burma in a sustainable manner. At Tripartite Dialogue, at least three challenges can be foreseen:

(i) The role of Armed Forces in future democratic Union of Burma: The SPDC’s Generals are demanding, as they have proposed at the National Convention in 1995, that they should control at least 25% of parliamentary seats, and also in state and division assemblies. Can such undemocratic demand be accepted?
(ii) The 1990 election result: Can the NLD compromise their hard won victory in order to form a Transitional Authority, in which they need to include military and ethnic nationalities?
(iii) Federalism: The establishment of Federal Union is the ultimate goal, especially for ethnic nationalities. But, the SPDC Generals maintain that Federalism equals “disintegration of the Union”, which they oppose. How could agreement be reached on this particular issue? Is there any compromise possible with such opposing views?

In addition to the challenges that will be faced at the dialogue table, there are a number of obstacles, partly because of the misconception of dialogue itself. Some people think that a dialogue strategy means only a “tripartite dialogue”, which for the Myanmar ethnic group in exile is too complicated and should therefore be bypassed altogether. Htun Aung Kyaw, for example, said “tripartite dialogue at this point in time will not offer the solution. Instead it will complicate a situation.”  On the other hand, most ethnic nationalities leaders envision the “tripartite dialogue” as similar to the negotiation at the 1947 Panglong conference. It might be suggested that dialogue as a strategy should not be seen as a “One Time Event”, but rather should be seen as a long term process, in which “tripartite dialogue” is only one step in a very long process.

A single main obstacle to dialogue, of course, is the SPDC’s unwillingness to engage in dialogue with democratic forces and ethnic nationalities. Since they first came to power in 1962, General Ne Win and his successors have never believed in a peaceful political settlement. Their strategy has always been one of violent suppression, for they only believe in power that comes from the barrel of a rifle. The most effective tactics they employ are those of violent confrontations, including civil war and urban killings. And they want their opponents to play along accordingly, as they are masters of violence. In fact, violent confrontation is the name of their game which they want to deploy at any cost. On the other end, they refuse to engage dialogue because they know and think that they are going to lose if they do.

One of the most disturbing excuses for the unwillingness among some in the movement to accept the dialogue strategy is that “SPDC is not sincere, and they are not going to enter into a dialogue”. Sincerity seems an inappropriate word in this regard, because one cannot expect “sincerity” from one’s opponent. It is obvious that the Generals are going to use every brutal means that they can in order to keep their power intact. Holding on to power at any cost is their ultimate goal, and ethnic Myanmar domination through Tatmadaw is their dream; violent suppression is the strategy they employ to achieve their goal, torture and killing are the tactics they use, deception is the method they apply, and avoiding dialogue is their escape. Surely, the junta is buying time and weapons to keep their power. However, democratic forces and ethnic leaders should know that therein lay their strengths and weaknesses. Thus, it is essential to study their strength and weaknesses, and analyze why they refuse to engage dialogue. What is needed to do, therefore, is to create a situation—through coordinated local, national and international efforts—whereby the junta will have to come to the negotiating table, to see dialogue not as a danger but as a way to resolve the conflict in Burma that has plunged the country into crisis.

PART THREE: TACTICS

Tactics: Non-violent Actions (Internal Pressures, People’s Power), Armed Resistance Movement, and International Pressures, etc.

The term “tactic” is seldom used in this movement. Instead, “strategies” is used interchangeably with “tactic”. The misuse of terminology can cause a lot of confusion and misunderstanding, as observed by a Shan politician and leader, “A lot of time has been wasted in the meeting debating which strategy to recognize and support and which to discard or abandon, without a practical acceptable outcome for all the groups because each group has its own strategies [tactics?] based on its own political role, status and space which are different from one another.”

As a matter of fact, terms like “strategy” and “tactic” are dynamic words, not static or rigid, in terms of both theory and practice. Armed Struggle, for example, can be the main “strategy” of certain ethnic armed groups, but it has become a “tactic” for the entire movement. Likewise, “economic sanction against the regime” can be the main “strategy” of certain international Burma support groups, but they should be only one of the “tactics” in terms of the entire democracy movement in Burma. It is essential to look at the big picture of the entire movement, in which all “strategies” and “tactics” are integrated in to a “Grand Strategy”. As has been pointed out, “the strategies of ENSCC, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s NLD, UNA and other democratic forces should be considered as part of the Grand Strategy of the movement.”  The understanding of “the Grand Strategy will create cohesion among the groups, who could independently carry out their own strategy [tactic?], having in mind that one’s strategy is complimentary to others in the integrated GRAND STRATEGY form, because all are striving towards the same accepted aims.”

1. Non-violent Actions (Internal Pressures and People’s Power)

Since the 1988 popular uprising for democracy, the struggle for freedom in Burma has usually been described as “non-violent movement”. The notion of “non-violent movement” was strengthen when Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was awarded Nobel Peace Prize in 1991. Indeed, the non-violent actions in 1988 represented the finest hours of Burma’s democracy movement, which remains today its greatest strength for the struggle. Moreover, “non-violent action” is the most relevant tactic which can easily translate into the grand strategy in order to produce a final victory.

Some leaders and activists in the movement now criticize “non-violent movement” as “passivity, submissiveness, and cowardice.” However, non-violent action, as Gene Sharp asserts, is “not to be equated with verbal or purely psychological persuasion, although it may use action to induce psychological pressures for attitude change; non-violent action, instead of words, is a sanction and a technique of struggle involving the use of social, economic and political power, and the matching of forces in conflict.”  It is not submission or cowardice, as Pundit Nehru once wrote,

In spite of its negative name it was a dynamic method, the very opposite of a meek submission to a tyrant’s will. It was not a coward’s refuge from action, but a brave man’s defiance of evil and national subjection.

The basic theory of non-violent action is that the “political power of governments or dictators disintegrates when the people withdraw their obedience and support”. Based on this simple theory that the political power of governments may in fact be very fragile, Mahatma Gandhi challenged British colonial power, saying that:

You have great military resources. Your naval power is matchless. If we wanted to fight with you on your own ground, we should be unable to do so, but if the above submissions be not accepted to you, we cease to play the part of the ruled. You, if you like, cut us to pieces. You may shatter us at the cannon’s mouth. If you act contrary to our will, we shall not help you; and without our help, we know that you cannot move one step forward.

Gandhi’s theory of non-violent action is based on the fact that “if the maintenance of an unjust or undemocratic regime depends on the cooperation, submission and obedience of the populace, then the means for changing or abolishing it lies in the non-cooperation, defiance and disobedience of the populace.”  Applying Gandhi’s theory of non-violent action, Gene Sharp out lines the main characteristics of non-violent action as follow:

In political terms non-violent action is based on a very simple postulate: people do not always do what they are told to do, and sometimes they do things which have been forbidden to them. Subjects may disobey laws they reject. Workers may halt work, which may paralyze the economy. The bureaucracy may refuse to carry out instructions. Soldiers and police may become lax in inflicting repression; they may even mutiny. When all these events happen simultaneously, the man who has been “ruler” becomes just another man.

And he concludes, by saying that:

The human assistance which created and supported the regime’s political power has been withdrawn. Therefore, its power has disintegrated.

Since 1988, non-violent actions have applied in various means and ways and it will continue to do so. The important factor, however, is that the tactics of non-violent actions need to be able to translate into a grand strategy, which will bring the final victory for the movement. During the 1988 uprising, the movement employed the best tactic of non-violent actions but did not have a grand strategy. The movement, therefore, needs to learn lessons from both its successes and failures.

2. Armed Resistance Movement (A.R.M)

Carl von Clausewitz, in his classic work On War, wrote, “war is the continuation of politics by other means”. His famous quote leads to the discussions of those of “other means”, that is, the military strategy of winning war through force, but “it does not say how to achieve the state’s goal without war.”  In contrast to the Western concept of war, ancient Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu in his The Art of War suggested that military strategy should be integrated into domestic policy and foreign policy in a form of “state craft”, which includes “looking beyond conflict to its resolution, ensuring peace and system of interstate relationships more profitable to one’s nation.”

The Armed Resistance Movement (A.R.M) that all the non-Myanmar ethnic nationalities in Burma engage is, in essence, different from waging offensive war. The difference is that in offensive war, military strategy is deployed in order to win the war by force. The A.R.M. of Burma’s ethnic nationalities has never applied such a strategy, but holds arms only for defensive purpose. The similarity, however, is that ethnic nationalities in Burma engage in civil war only because they are unable to resolve the conflict through peaceful means. The A.R.M, therefore, is, like any war, “the continuation of politics by other means”.

None of non-Myanmar ethnic nationalities in Burma believe that the armed struggle or A.R.M. is the end game. It is only for self-defence. However, “as long as SPDC wages war on us”, as one of CNF (Chin National Front) leaders said, “killing our children in order to wipe out our future generations, using rape as weapon of war against ethnic minorities in the country, and applying religious persecution as the method of destroying ethnic identities, especially against the Chin Christians; our hands will be forced to hold arms in order to protect our children, to defend our mothers, our sisters and our homeland, and to uphold our dignity and identity intact.”  

It is, therefore, very clear that the dialogue strategy does not reject A.R.M. altogether. It encourages A.R.M as an important “tactical means” for the movement, as part and parcel of the pressures that should be put on military junta to bring it to the dialogue table. It is essential to build unity among ethnic armed groups, and support the efforts of the NDF (National Democratic Front), the largest alliance of Ethnic Armed Groups in Burma, and “Five Nations Military Alliance”. However, as Sun Tzu suggested, the long term goal of A.R.M should be “to subdue the enemy without fighting”, which he said is “the acme of skill”. The best military “strategy is not only to achieve the nation’s aims through controlling or influencing its sphere of influence, but to do so without resorting to fighting.”

According to Sun Tzu, the best military strategy is the one that can subdue the enemy through negotiation and talk without fighting; that is what we call in our context “dialogue” which will bring a “win-win” solution to the establishment of a democratic government in Burma. A stable and peaceful democratic Union of Burma will ensure regional stability and world peace; it will no longer be a country that produces all kind of narcotic drugs, HIV-AIDS disease, refugees, migrant workers, etc., which cause many problems for our neighbouring countries and international community as a whole.  

War, including A.R.M, may sometimes be a necessary evil. But, as Jimmy Carter said, “no matter how necessary, it is always an evil, never a good. We will not learn how to live together in peace by killing each other’s children.”  That’s the reason why dialogue, not war, is calling for by all.

3. International Pressures

As mentioned above, “dialogue” was adopted by the democracy movement as a grand strategy, and it was based on the United Nations General Assembly resolution of 1994. This indicates the fact that international pressure is view as a very important strategic and tactical factor. In the ENSCC’s Road Map, the role of international community has been strongly emphasized as follow:

We welcome and appreciate the concern of the international community over the crisis in our country. We specifically appreciate the leading role played by the United Nations, and the efforts of the Government of Thailand to bring about national reconciliation. We also appreciate the concern expressed by the international community, in particular ASEM, ASEAN, Canada, China, Japan, the European Union, Norway and the USA.

From the very beginning, the movement has adopted at least three international pressure tracks, to put strong pressures on the military junta to get it to the dialogue table. They are, One, lobbying the UN, governments, regional blocs, neighboring countries such as China, India, Japan, to bring about diplomatic pressure for dialogue; Two, undertaking international campaigns, calling for sanctions, exposing and condemning human rights abuses by the regime, exposing forced labor practices, highlighting the plight of political prisoners, and so on; and Three, calling for international mediation..

The role of International Mediation has been highlighted by the ENSSC’s Road Map, saying that “to ensure that the transition progresses smoothly and on schedule, we request that the international community under the leadership of the UN, Thailand, and ASEAN continue to assist in the transition process”.  It is, therefore, very clear that the “third party” involvement in this process is more than welcomed. However, the exact role of third party intervention or involvement still needs to be clarified, that is what kind of third party involvement will be needed:  Arbitration? Facilitation? Pure Mediation? Or Power Mediation?

Conclusion

In this paper, I have explored: What is the ultimate goal of democracy movement in Burma? What is the grand strategy that the movement has adopted to achieve its goal? And what are tactics that the movement has applied?  I have argued that the strategy and tactics may change in accordance with the changing political situation has demanded, but the changing strategy and tactics shall not affect the ultimate goal.

The central argument in this paper is that the fundamental issues of political crisis in Burma is not only ideological confrontation between democracy and totalitarianism, but a constitutional problem rooted in the question of self-determination for non-Myanmar (non-Burman) ethnic nationalities who joined the Union as equal partners in 1947 at Panglong. The ultimate goal of democracy movement in Burma, therefore, is not just changing the government in Rangoon but to establish a genuine democratic federal union, where various ethnic nationalities from different backgrounds (ethnically, culturally, religiously, linguistically, and historically, etc.,) can live peacefully together.

I have highlighted in this paper that since 1994, the movement has adopted “dialogue” as the main strategy based on the United Nation General Assembly’s resolution which called for a “tripartite dialogue”. The main source of “dialogue strategy”, however, is derived from non-violent actions which the movement has taken since 1988, under the leadership of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. As such, non-violent actions and international pressures become the most important tactics in this movement, which put the pressures on the military junta to bring it to a dialogue table.

I also argued that adopting “dialogue” as a “grand strategy” does not undermine the “Armed Resistance Movement” which most of the non-Myanmar ethnic groups are engaging in order to defend themselves for more than five decades.  As a matter of fact, the armed resistance that all the non-Myanmar ethnic nationalities in Burma engage in is a defensive war. Moreover, they carry arms and waged an armed struggle only because they are unable to resolve the conflict through peaceful means. None of non-Myanmar ethnic nationalities in Burma believe that the armed struggle or armed resistance is the end game. It is only for self-defence.

Strategically speaking, armed resistance or struggle constitutes only a tactical means, a part and parcel of the pressures that should be put on the military junta in order to bring them to a negotiating table.

Since the military junta is refusing to engage in dialogue, it is essential to employ several tactics at once, to make sure that the strategy works properly. All kind of tactics, such as, Non-violent Actions (including Internal Pressures and the so-called “People’s Power”), Armed Resistance Movement (A.R.M.) and International Pressures, etc., should be integrated into the Grand Strategy of the entire movement in order to produce a final victory.

Lian H. Sakhong
Uppsala, 2003-10-23

Ethnic Nationalities Perspective

By Lian H. Sakhong¨

[Note: A speech delivered at “Conference on Indo-Burma Relation”, India International Centre on September 16-17, 2004.]

Thank you so much for giving me this opportunity to speak about our struggle for self-determination in Burma. The concept of self-determination, as we all know, is rather a new phenomenon in world history; it came into being only after French Revolution, together with the idea of the “nation” as the whole people, as the object of ultimate political loyalty, and as endowed with an alienable right to self-determination and separate statehood.  When the “League of Nations” was founded after the First World War, the right of self-determination has become an international phenomenon, especially when “minority protection scheme” was formulated on the principle of “national self-determination”, according to which, as Woodrow Wilson put it, “every people have a right to choose the sovereignty under which they shall live”.

The concept of “self-determination” was a very useful tool for the peoples who tried to free themselves from colonial powers. For them, the right of self-determination was defined mostly in terms of “sovereignty”, “separate statehood” and “independent nation-sate”.

During the cold war, however, both camps of Liberal West and Socialist East put greater emphasis on “territorial integrity” rather than on “national self-determination”. The consensus among the major power was that anti-colonial movement was a particular category of conflict, which provided a potential dilemma and challenge in terms of self-determination. They argued that the goal in the decolonization process was the creation of new states from the territories legally and militarily held by colonial powers. The issue, they argued, was to control over territory within what was, formally speaking, one state.

So, if we looked back the cold war period, it was very obvious that international communities and bodies, including the United Nations, followed the lead given by the two super powers. We can also see that there was relatively little recognition in international law for substantive minority rights, let alone the rights of self-determination. When the United Nations adopted its Universal Declaration of Human Rights, all references to the rights of ethnic minorities were deleted. The hope was that the new emphasis on “human rights” and the principle of non-discrimination would resolve minority conflicts. Rather than protecting vulnerable groups directly, through special rights for the members of particular groups, they argued that cultural and ethnic minorities would be protected indirectly, by guaranteeing basic civil and political rights to all individuals, regardless of group membership.

However, it has become increasingly clear that existing human rights standards are simply unable to resolve some of the most important and controversial questions relating to cultural and ethnic minorities. As Kymlicka argues,

The right to free speech does not tell us what an appropriate language policy is; the right to vote doesn’t tell us how political boundaries should be drawn, or how powers should be distributed between levels of government; the right to mobility doesn’t tell us what an appropriate immigration and naturalization policy is. These questions have been left to the usual process of majoritarian decision-making within each state. The result has been to render cultural [and ethnic] minorities vulnerable to significant injustice at the hands of the majority, and to exacerbate ethno-cultural conflict.

Since the end of the cold war, there has been increasing interest at the international level in supplementing traditional human rights principles with a theory of minority rights and collective rights. For example, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe adopted a declaration on the Rights of National Minorities in 1991, and established a High Commissioner on National Minorities in 1993. The United Nations has debated both a Declaration on Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (1993) and a Draft Universal Declaration on Indigenous Rights (1998). In 1992, the Council of Europe adopted a declaration on minority language rights (the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages). This new development, after the collapsed of Soviet Union, is the most encouraging sign for our struggle for democracy and human rights in Burma.  

On the other hands, as the changing world demands, we have to re-define the term “self-determination” accordingly. After Maastricht Treaty in 1992, most scholars tend to define the right of “self-determination” in terms of two categories; “internal self-determination” and “external self-determination”. While “internal self-determination” is concerned mainly with “collective rights” of a group of people(s) within the boundary of modern “nation-state”; “external self-determination” refers to sovereignty, separate statehood and independent nation-state. A combination of the term “internal self-determination” and the meaning of “collective rights” reflect the fact that “collective rights” is not merely cultural, religious, linguistic, and identity rights, etc., it also includes political rights with its full extend of powers, that is., legislative, administrative and judiciary powers.

Against this theoretical background, let me argue that what we—ethnic nationalities in Burma— are fighting for is a kind of “internal self-determination”, and we are struggling for our collective rights, including political rights and autonomous status for our respective homelands; and we strongly believe that these are our alienable rights but denied so long by the successive governments of the Union of Burma since independence in 1948. So, let me be very clear that individual rights is not enough for us; we need our collective rights as a people, as an ethnic group, as a nationality who speak different language, who practice different culture, who worship different religion and who also has different historical background and, above all, all of us have territorially clearly defined homelands and nations since time immemorial. And the simple fact is: We want to rule our homeland by ourselves. But we also know that we have to live together with other peoples and other ethnic groups who practice different religions and cultures and speak different languages. So, the challenge here is to find a political and legal system which will allow us to rule our respective homelands by ourselves, and at same time living peacefully together with others.  In other words, this is the question of how we are going to find a political system which can combine and balance between “self-rule” for different ethnic groups and “shared-rule” for all the peoples in the Union of Burma.

We believe that the best means to combine and balance between “self-rule” for ethnic national homelands and a “shared-rule” for the Union is federal system, or Pyi-daung-suu, in Burmese. As we all know, federalism can generally be defined as an approach to government that divides public powers not only horizontally, i.e. separation of powers between legislative, administrative and judiciary; but vertically, i.e. division of powers between two or more levels of government. In other words, federalism is a constitutional device which provides for a secure, i.e. constitutional, division of powers between ‘central’ and ‘states’ authorities in such a way that each is acknowledged to be the supreme authority in specific areas of responsibility. The basic essence of federalism, therefore, is the notion of two or more orders of government combining elements of ‘shared rule’ for some purposes and ‘self-rule’ for the other. As such, federalism is seen as a constitutionally established balance between ‘shared rule’ and ‘self-rule’; ‘shared rule’ through common institutions and ethnic homeland or regional ‘self-rule’ through the governments of the constituent units or states. The federal principles of ‘self-rule’ and ‘shared rule’, on the other hand, is based on the objective of combining unity and diversity, i.e. of accommodating, preserving and promoting distinct identities within a larger political union.

We, therefore, claims that the ultimate goal of our struggle is to establish a genuine Federal Union of Burma, which will guarantee democratic rights for all citizens, political equality for all nationalities and the rights of self-determination for all member states of the Union.  We openly declared that democracy without federalism would not solve the political crisis in Burma, including the civil war, which has already been fought for five long decades. So, let me repeat that for us, the ultimate goal of the democratic movement in present Burma is not only to restore democratic government but to establish a genuine federal union.  In other words, we ethnic nationalities in Burma view the root cause of political crisis in Burma today as a constitutional problem rather than a purely ideological confrontation between democracy and dictatorship.

As part of our preparation for the establishment of a genuine federal union, we—the UNLD-LA and NDF, two of the largest ethnic political alliances—have undertaken state constitutions drafting process since 2001. We view state constitutions drafting process as a long term process, through which we are engaging inter and intra ethnic dialogue; we encourage all ethnic nationalities in Burma to discuss among themselves and with other ethnic groups what their problems are and how they want to solve, empower them to define their own political future in preparing for political structures that they wish to establish, and create conditions to safeguard and promote democratic system and federal union that we all aim to establish. We now have seven states constitution drafting committees for the Arankan, Chin, Kachin, Karen, Karenni, Mon and Shan. We also have a study group for Burman State Constitution, a group which is preparing for the future Burman State Constitution. All these state constitution committees are working, helping and networking each other through “Supporting Committee for State Constitutions Drafting Process” (SCSC), a committee formed by UNLD-LA and NDF. The SCSC is working closely also with Federal Constitution Drafting Committee, which is formed under the supervision of NCUB.

In order to achieve our ultimate goal of establishing federal union, we are opting for “tripartite dialogue” as our grand strategy. The term “tripartite dialogue” was first used in the 1994 United Nations General Assembly’s resolution, which called for a negotiated settlement through negotiation amongst three parties: the military government known as “State Peace and Development Council” (SPDC), the 1990 election winning party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), and ethnic nationalities—who are the founding nations or national groups of the Union.

The essence of tripartite dialogue is “inclusiveness” and “recognition” which, in concepts, includes all the major political stakeholders, or conflict parties in Burma: military junta, democratic forces led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and ethnic nationalities. Moreover, the UN’s tripartite dialogue resolution recognizes the 1990 election results which have been denied by the military government for 14 years, and recognizes the indispensable participation of ethnic nationalities in the political transition and national reconciliation process in Burma.

The UN resolution also acknowledges the very nature of political crisis in Burma which, as mentioned above, is a “constitutional problem” rather than solely an ideological confrontation between democracy and military rule or totalitarianism. It is not a “minority” problem, or even an ethnic problem which some Burman or Myanmar ethnic politicians argue can be solved later, once democracy is established. The question of democracy, military rule and the constitutional arrangement with special reference to the non-Myanmar (non-Burman) ethnic nationalities—comprising close to 40 percent of the total population—are intrinsically intertwined and cannot be solved one without the other. This is the meaning behind the call for a “tripartite dialogue”.

As we adopted a “tripartite dialogue” as our grand strategy, we have undertaken pro-active and constructive actions to bring about a peaceful resolution to the political conflict in Burma through a dialogue process. As part of our preparation for tripartite dialogue, the “Ethnic Nationalities Solidarity and Cooperation Committee” (ENSCC) was formed in 2001, and worked hard to co-ordinate the following non-Burman political groupings:

(i)         Political parties under the leadership of United Nationalities League for Democracy (UNLD)

(ii)        Armed groups which are members of National Democratic Front (NDF),

(iii)       Armed groups but not members of NDF, such as Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) and Shan State Army (SSA-South).

(iv)       Ceasefire groups.

After two years of hard works, the ENSCC now is transformed as a working committee of “Ethnic Nationalities Council” (ENC), which was formed in January 2004, at the 3rd Ethnic Nationalities Conference. The ENC has been entrusted with task of fostering unity and cooperation between all ethnic nationalities forces and promotes peaceful political settlement in Burma through tripartite dialogue. It was also resolved that the ENC would:          

¨      Promote the profile of the Ethnic Nationalities on the international stage.

¨      Coordinate and work for tripartite dialogue.

¨      Reviving the Panglong Spirit, based on the principles of democracy, equality and self-determination.

¨      Build or facilitate unity and cohesion among all ethnic nationalities forces, inside and outside, including promoting and supporting political actions inside.

I must also mention that the “Ethnic Nationalities Council – Union of Burma” is the largest non-Burman ethnic political alliance in Burma, which includes all the political parties under the leadership of UNLD, armed groups which are members of NDF, armed groups but not members of NDF, and some members of CF. The main political objectives of ENC are as follows:

(i)         To end military dictatorship,

(ii)        To establish a genuine democratic federal union,

(iii)       To ensure democracy, human rights and self-determination.

For peace in the country, the flourishing of democracy, the establishment of a federal system, and the speedy and timely emergence of democratic transition, the ENC is determined to launch the “The New Panglong Initiative: Rebuilding the Union of Burma”, initiative consisting of the following points:

(i)                  To hold, at the earliest date, the tripartite dialogue, as called for by the UN resolutions annually since 1994;

(ii)                To form an interim government comprising of representatives, proportionally, of  the SPDC, the NLD and  other political parties, victorious in the 1990 elections, and the ethnic nationalities, based on the agreement arrived at the  tripartite dialogue;

(iii)               The interim government is to convene a legitimate “National Convention”;

(iv)              To form various commissions, with approval of the National Convention, to draft constitutions of the Federal Union and the constituent States;

(v)                To hold national referendum for adoption of the Federal Constitution and to hold referendum in various constituent States for adoption of respective State Constitutions;

(vi)              To hold elections at national level and state level for the formation of Federal government and State governments in various States in accordance with the newly adopted Federal and respective State Constitutions;

(vii)             Subsequent to the elections, the Federal and State parliaments (legislatures) are to be convened and the respective election-winning parties are to form the Federal and various State governments;

The ENC does not believe that the SPDC’s 7-stages “road map” and its National Convention will lead to democratization and establishment of a federal union. The sole purpose of SPDC’s National Convention is to sustain a military dictatorship and transform itself from De Facto Government to De Jure Government through constitution. The ENC, therefore, issued a statement on 14 May 2004, in support of CF groups’ letter to the SPDC. Part of the statement read as follows:

(i)                 The National Convention procedural rules should be discussed and revised;

(ii)               Objective No. 6 of the National Convention (military role in politics) is not compatible with democracy. It should be discussed and revised;

(iii)             The 104 Articles adopted by the previous National Convention are not compatible with democracy. It should be discussed and revised.

(iv)             Law No. 5/96, which was enacted on 7 June 1996 to protect the 1993-96 National Convention, should be repealed.

The ENC is willing to cooperate and find ways to bring about a transition if above are met. Politics is about making compromises and the ENC is willing to discuss options if the SPDC considers modifying its 7- points Road Map. And, the ENC still believes that the best means to solve our country problem is through a negotiated settlement; and we, therefore, strongly demands a tripartite dialogue as called for by the UNGA since 1994.

In conclusion, I would like to stress again that the right of “self-determination” that we are struggling for is what we call “internal self-determination”: which will guarantees our collective rights; the right to rule our homeland by ourselves, the right to practice our religious teaching and culture freely, the right to teach, learn and promote our language freely, and the right to up-hold our identity without fear and live peacefully together with others. I can assure you that we are not separatists. We are for a united Union of Burma, but what we want is a genuine federal union where all ethnic groups in Burma can live peacefully together.

Thank you!

Dr. Lian H. Sakhong

General Secretary

United Nationalities League for Democracy UNLD-LA), and

Ethnic Nationalities Council – Union of Burma (ENC)

2004-09-09  

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¨  Dr. Lian H. Sakhong is General Secretary of “United Nationalities League for Democracy – Liberated Areas” (UNLD-LA) and of “Ethnic Nationalities Council – Union of Burma” (ENC). He was post-graduate student at History Department in Rangoon University when student-led democracy movement erupted in 1988. He quickly joined the movement and was arrested, interrogated and even tortured by military junta for three separate occasions between 1988 and 1990. He fled from his country in 1990 and resettled in Sweden since 1991. He has published numerous articles on Chin history, traditions and politics in Burma, including his Ph.D. dissertation: Religion and Politics in Burma (Uppsala University, 2000) and his book, In Search of Chin Identity: A Study in Religion, Politics and Ethnic Identity in Burma (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 2003). He also edited a series of eight books under the title of Peaceful-coexistence: Towards Federal Union of Burma (Chiang Mai: UNLD Press, between 1999 and 2004).

By Mai Mang Khan Cing (Bianca Son)

Introduction

The modern political history of Burma reads like a checklist of political experiments “gone bad.”  Before British rule, Burma consisted of independent kingdoms, princely states, chiefdoms and independent communities.  Under British rule, the above mentioned all became a part of British India.  After Independence in 1947, the Union of Burma was formed. General Aung San, father of the famous Nobel laureate, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, drafted a Constitution.  Part of the draft Constitution was the Panlong Agreement in which General Aung San promised the non-Burman, e.g. the ethnic minorities equality and autonomy.  However, just months after the Panlong agreement, General Aung San and his entire cabinet were assassinated.  U Nu took over and the draft constitution was altered, betraying both the letter and spirit of the Panlong Agreement.  The amendments invalidated the recognition of the formerly proud nations and all were claimed under the same umbrella–the Union of Burma. The former independent states did not then, nor now, identify themselves as “Burmese.” After a military coup, Burma became a military dictatorship under General Ne Win.  The military dictatorship continues in present day.

The Military regime is not about politics, rather about power.  There are no attempts to invade other countries to gain larger territories, resources or to spread its ideology—whatever that may be.  Their primary goal, as it appears, is for economic power—more specifically, money for those in-charge, namely the military heads of power. Burma is abundant in natural resources.  It has rich teak forests, mineral wealth and natural gas.  Moreover, it is strategically placed within Southeast Asia.   The natural resources are often located in the hill areas that are occupied by the ethnic minorities who are, typically, subsistence farmers. Besides the natural resources, the ethnic minorities are also an abounding source of forced labor—and are used till they are, literally and actually, an exhausted human resource.  These Ethnic minorities often rebel by creating insurgent groups to fight the Burmese military.   Therefore, Burma has no enemies other than its own people—the ethnic minorities.  Not only do they rise up as insurgent groups, occasionally alert the international community and report about the atrocities happening in Burma, they also occupy valuable territories.  It is, therefore, crucial for the regime to “cleanse” itself of these ethnic minorities.  In order to avoid international intervention, the Burmese regime operates to achieve its end in concealment. In this paper, it is argued that the Burmese have managed to conceal overt ethnic cleansing by avoiding outright mass murder, employing isolationism and forced migration.

Ethnic Cleansing Defined

The definition of ethnic cleansing is contested.  The scholar, Angelica Means argues the definition of ethnic cleansing, “The term ‘ethnic cleansing’ has a long usage. It refers to the removal of one group to achieve the cohesion necessary for state formation and nation-building. The theory is that ‘one people, one state’ lessens internal violence, and actually makes possible the comity of states.”    This is certainly true in the case of Burma.  One reason that the Burmese military actively attacks ethnic groups is due, in part, to the high number of opposition and insurgent groups.  Vumson (2001) argued that Ne Win fostered insurgent groups in order to justify the attacks, displacement, and killings of ethnic groups.    A more appropriate definition may be, “Although ‘ethnic cleansing’ is not formally defined under international law, a U.N. Commission of Experts has defined the term as a ‘purposeful policy designed by one ethnic or religious group to remove by violent and terror-inspiring means the civilian population of another ethnic or religious group from certain geographic areas. . . . This purpose appears to be the occupation of territory to the exclusion of the purged group or groups.”   

In 2003, using the above definition, the United States government passed a bill stating that what is happening in Burma is, in fact, ethnic cleansing.  It reads, “ (6) The SPDC is engaged in ethnic cleansing against minorities within Burma, including the Karen, Karenni, and Shan people, which constitutes a crime against humanity and has directly led to more than 600,000 internally displaced people living within Burma and more than 130,000 people from Burma living in refugee camps along the Thai-Burma border.”

The above solidifies the argument that ethnic cleansing is occurring in Burma.  Further, it is important to state that the notion of ethnic cleansing may evoke impressions of campaigns.  Campaigns are usually held in short periods of time where much energy and focus is given to a specific end.   In Nazi Germany, for instance, ethnic cleansing occurred in a relatively short period of time—a matter of five to seven years.   The ethnic cleansing of Kosovo also happened in a relatively short period.  “Relative” in that other cases of ‘ethnic cleansing’ and or attempts at ethnic cleansing took longer to achieve.  The occupation of Korea by the Japanese, for example, took over a century.  Although the term “ethnic cleansing” is rather modern, the acts of the Japanese fall under the same definition.  The Japanese invaded Korea and forced Koreans to take Japanese names and disallowed the Korean language.  Their intent was to take the Korean peninsula and make it Japanese.  The English invaded Wales and also disallowed the use of the Welsh language.  The Welsh claim, today, that the English attempted to cleanse ethnic Welsh by forcing them to become English.   In short, ethnic-cleansing campaigns may take decades to achieve.  The Burmese are not rounding up ethnic groups and murdering them.  They are proceeding slowly.  If they were to do so, the ethnic cleansing could not occur in concealment.

Avoidance of Mass Murder
One way the regime employs ethnic cleansing is by using ethnic minorities as land mine sweepers. Land mines are victim-activated weapons that kill or maim its victims—indiscriminately. Burma is second to Afghanistan in land mine victims–surpassing Cambodia.  Evidence suggests that at least one person falls victim to a land mine each day.  Further, Burma’s regime has refused to sign the Mine Ban Treaty at the UN in 1999.   The regime plants mines on supply and escape routes used by refugees, villagers, or insurgent and resistance groups. Of late, land mines are also planted to “protect” oil pipelines and natural gas pipelines which run through both, Eastern and Western Burma. Some ethnic insurgents group plant landmines to protect themselves against the military regime.  However, they themselves are likely to be maimed or killed by these mines. Often villagers who have been forcibly relocated will attempt to return to his/her “motherland.” where they fall victim to a mine.  

One interviewee described being a human land mind sweeper for the Burmese military, “…[I] was forced to seek mines using a long sharpened bamboo prod, piercing the ground and removing any found mines by hand.”  Along the same journey, two other villager porters stepped on landmines and both of them were immediately killed. ”  

Other villagers had similar stories.  One man reported that, “On 2nd March, the SPDC  troops came to my home village in Karen State; just a few hours walk from the Thai border. The villagers tried to escape to the forest, taking with them what they could. When the troops arrived, they caught the chicken, killed the pigs and burned down some houses. They also destroyed the rice stocks. One villager was killed and the landmines planted by the soldiers maimed two thers. Three other villagers were forced to work as army porters, to walk ahead of the troops in the front line.”
Fink (2001) also interviewed an ethnic minority who spoke about his experience as a human land mine sweeper. Cho Zin who lived near the Thai-Burma border explained that in 1996, he along with dozens other villagers were forced to sweep for mines.  The Burmese Army told them to clear the route, “…with their legs…” (p. 126).  Two land mine sweepers including Cho Zin stepped on mines.  The other two died on the spot-instantly.  Cho Zin was lucky.   Fellow villagers got him to a hospital in Thailand, his lower leg was amputated and he survived. According to Cho Zin, in the four or five villages near his own, there were over a hundred amputees.

Forced Labor

The regime also uses the ethnic minorities as forced labor for numerous projects from creating space for an oil pipeline to building palaces for tourism.  According to a None Governmental Organization ( NGO), “Gendersite,” the use of Ethnic minorities as a means of forced labor is widespread and responsible for thousands of deaths each year.     The International Labor Organization (ILO) has described forced labor in Myanmar as “an endemic abuse affecting hundreds of thousands of workers who [are] subjected to the most extreme forms of exploitation.”

Forced labor is employed to deforest Burma. Keating (1997) interviewed villagers, “Everyone in an unnamed town and its surrounding area were forced to work in rotating shifts. Each village and section of town was directed to send people to work two of each three months. ‘Each day,’ reported one conscript, ‘My section of town has to send [as many as] 20 people, depending on how many the soldiers demand. There are 60 houses in my section. I’ve had to go twice to cut the trees, for one day each time. We had to take all our own tools, machetes and saws. They make us cut everything down, even the bamboo trees. Then we have to dig out the stumps too, and give them to the Army. It’s all taken away by Army trucks”    Keating further argues that as the forests are cleared out, the rainwater runs off instead being reabsorbed.  This will eventually lead to drought leaving the people without means for growing their own food.

Another example of forced labor is the “Death Ponds”. About 20,000 people have been forced to dig ponds each dry season. Villagers must provide all their own tools or work with their hands. Each family is assigned two ponds and must also use the excavated earth to build smooth terraces around on which they must plant banana trees. These ponds will eventually serve as cooling off sites for tourists.  People who are forced to dig these ponds have named them the “Death Ponds”, because more than 100 people have already died of sickness and exhaustion made worse by sunstroke while working on the project. Officers of the Southern Command have driven out all of the subsistence farmers who used to own this land. This illustrates both, forced labor as well as forced migration.  

Prisoners are also a source of labor.  The conditions are treacherous, especially in the Mon State, which boasts several mineral and semi-precious excavating mines.  Prisoners starve to death, die of exposure, are killed in accidents involving mine explosions, are beaten to death and many commit suicide because of the atrocious conditions.

Further, for villagers to lose a family member for even one week can be devastating in terms of income.  Worse is when the family member becomes ill with malaria or dysentery.  Many die from work related injuries.  Zaw Htun on the Thazi dam in northwestern Burma explains that in 1995, he and his brother were forced to build the dam under constant guard of Burmese soldiers.  The soldiers were always drunk; they molested the girls and women and beat them indiscriminately. Some were beaten to death and their bodies were simply thrown into the jungle
Fink (2001).  Again, although no overt mass murders are occurring, the ethnic minorities are slowly being killed.

Prohibition of Foreign Journalists

In order to keep the international community from realizing the atrocity occurring in Burma, the military government does not allow any foreign journalists into the country.  In fact, even local journalists are under scrutiny.

Burma is not the first nation that has prohibited foreign media.  The Chinese were notorious for keeping foreign media out of its borders.  The Tianaman Square media coverage came about when a Mikhail Gorbachev was to visit China in May 1989.  Students took advantage of the foreign press and created signs and banners designed to gain international attention.  The Chinese government appeared to have had trouble managing the protests and thus, did not respond immediately.  This way, the international media was not forced out immediately and managed to capture the protests.  Eventually, CNN and the BBC were thrown out of the country and coverage was terminated.  Still, the Tianaman Square Massacre brought the world’s attention to the Human Rights violations occurring in China.  The Burmese government is aware of the impact journalists may have and go to great lengths to avoid international attention.

One paramount event in Burma’s modern history was an uprising that, virtually, eluded the international media.  The uprising of students and common people alike occurred in August of 1988 referred to as “8888”.  There was virtually no coverage of the protests since foreign journalists had long been prohibited.  In this way, Burma was able to shield itself from international scrutiny, from criticism and intervention.  That is, the generals in Burma benefited from Burma’s relative low profile on the international stage.  In terms of inside Burma, however, paranoia is justified.  Although difficult to document, it is said that in every fifth house and every third person in a teashop may be a spy for the regime.  It is dangerous to discuss politics and worse yet, to speak to foreigners—everyone is a potential journalist.  And journalists may report to the world that the Burmese regime is cleansing itself of ethnic minorities and anyone else who opposes them.

Foreign journalists are not the only ones prohibited.  Burmese journalists face even greater risks.  That is, media in Burma is strictly state-controlled and functions strictly as a mouthpiece of the government.  Media personnel who resist government control are either jailed or forced to leave the country. U Thaung, publisher and editor of a newspaper Mirror Daily, was one amongst them.  He was jailed for three years by the government for his criticism against the government.  Most journalists eventually leave Burma and continue their work in foreign countries reporting on the ethnic cleansing.  However, because the international community is slow to recognize the regime’s actions, many are deported back and are either imprisoned or killed.  Some simply “disappear”.

Isolationism

Along with Burma’s admittance to ASEAN, hope emerged that there would be constructive engagement–that ASEAN’s non-intervention policy would be upheld whilst creating a road map for Burma’s future.  However, once Burma became part of ASEAN, its members were even more strongly tied to the non-intervention policy. (Guan, 2001)  This caused a rift between the European Union and ASEAN and meetings were suspended for several years.  When meetings resumed, several EU members did not attend, perhaps in protest.  Guan continues by addressing Burma’s economic situation.  He focuses on the fact that Burma must reduce its isolationism in order to participate in global economics and that its reliance on China is not viable–economically.  However, although Guan’s argument has merit in terms of economics, the isolation Burma employs is not only a means of hanging on to political power, but also to conceal the atrocities committed in Burma.  Ganesan (2006) has a similar argument, that ASEAN’s non-intervention policy in Burma is allowing Burma to further slip into poverty.  He further argues that Burma’s tentative openness for dialogue involving Aun San Suu Kyi is improving its position.  Still, although he mentions the atrocities and ethnic cleansing, Ganesan refers to them as “…secondary issues…(p. 32).  Needless to say, the Burmese regime appears to cooperate, yet the reality of its ethnic cleansing remains concealed.

Another country actively employing isolationism is North Korea.  It is often refereed to as the “Hermit Kingdom”.  It is the only country that had its communist dictatorship pass from father to son.  Few outsiders have entered North Korea.  When foreigners, be it journalists or potential investors do enter the country, visits are always limited to Pyongyang, North Korea’s capital.  Foreigners are never permitted to visit the country side which is said to be a wasteland and where thousands of people are, literally, starving to death while Kim Jong Il holds on to his ideology of “self-reliance.”   Like Burma, North Korea realizes that isolationism means protection from the international community.  That is to say, if the world were aware of the atrocities occurring in both countries, governments and/or other organizations may be compelled to intervene.

One example of such intervention is Kosova.  The ethnic cleansing occurring there were so treacherous that the UN finally elected to stop the overt ethnic cleansing happening in Kosova.   A United States Government 2001 Executive summary reads:

“Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo: An Accounting.  [It] is a new chapter in our effort to document the extent of human rights and humanitarian law violations in Kosovo, and to convey the size and scope of the Kosovo conflict. The information in this report is drawn from refugee accounts, NGO documentation, press accounts, and declassified information from government and international organization sources. The atrocities against Kosovar Albanians documented in this report occurred primarily between March and late June 1999. This document is a follow-up to the U.S. Department of State’s previous human rights report, Erasing History: Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo, which was released on May 10, 1999. The report reads, “A central question is the number of Kosovar Albanian victims of Serbian forces in Kosovo. Many bodies were found… in June 1999. The evidence is also now clear that Serbian forces conducted a systematic campaign to burn or destroy bodies, or to bury the bodies, then rebury them to conceal evidence of Serbian crimes. On June 4, at the end of the conflict, the Department of State issued the last of a series of weekly ethnic cleansing reports… at least 6,000 Kosovar Albanians were victims of mass murder, with an unknown number of victims of individual killings, and an unknown number of bodies burned or destroyed by Serbian forces throughout the conflict.”  

The Burmese regime learned a great lesson from Kosova.  If the world were aware of the ethnic cleansing occurring, intervention would be sent and the regime dismantled.  That is, the above clearly indicates the power the international community has to stop atrocities.  If, again, they are concealed however, atrocities continue without intervention.

Forced Migration

Forced migration is another means of ethnic cleansing. The International Association for the Study of Forced Migration defines forced migration as “…a general term that refers to the movements of refugees and internally displaced people (people displaced by conflicts) as well as people displaced by natural or environmental disasters, chemical or nuclear disasters, famine, or development projects.”
The manner in which forced migration is employed are numerous.  Three ways of achieving ethnic cleansing by forcing ethnic minorities to leave their territories, is by attacking the identities of ethnic minorities as related to their belongingness to their soil.  Other means are the use of systematic rape and the creation of human zoos on the borders of Burma.

Disconnection from Soil

Malkki (2006) discusses the notion of identity as related to soil. She questions, “…[ is it] necessary to rethink the question of roots in relation–if not to the soul—to identity, and to the forms of its territorilization.   The metaphorical concept of having roots involves intimate linkages between people and places…” (p. 24).  Malkki emphasizes the fact that scholars have argued that people have emotional ties to their soil.  She gives examples such as the fact that bodies and ashes of deceased are often transported back to their original homelands for burial to, “…the land where the genealogical tree of the ancestors grows (p. 27).”   Similarly, the Karen report that military soldiers cut down the very trees where Karen bury their miscarried and stillborn infants.   The trees, for the Karen, take on a symbolic meaning of life.  By cutting the trees down, they, literally become detached from their own soil (Fisher, 2006).

By extension, Malkki argues the fact that deterritorilization and identity are intimately linked as well.  Formulating her argument that identity and soil are not necessarily connected and that the assumption of it may have negative impacts; she quotes Cirtautus, “Homelessness is a serious threat to moral behavior…At the moment the refugee crosses the frontiers of his own world, his whole moral outlook, his attitude toward the divine order of life changes… [The refugees] conduct makes it obvious that we are dealing with individuals who are basically amoral, without any sense of personal or social responsibility…They no longer feel themselves bound by ethical precepts which every honest citizen…respects.  They become a menace, dangerous characters who will stop at nothing (p. 32).”  That is to say, the homeless person, as the Burmese government has assigned its ethnic minorities, are seen as potential dangers and must either be controlled or forced out of their regions. The Burmese government has itself told the international media that they are attacking the Karen State, because they want to protect themselves against “terrorist insurgents.”  As stated above, the minorities are often seen as a threat, especially once they are forced out of their own territories.  

Rape

Another means of forced migration is the overt use of rape.   A report released last year focused on the rape of Chin women (Zahau, 2005).   Her report is based on actual interviews of rape victims.  She interviewed villagers inside Chin State and on the Chin border over a period of five months. All interviewees were aware that their story was one among many.  However, in fear of retaliation from the Burmese soldiers as well as fear of social stigma kept many from sharing their stories. The Chin have strong Christian beliefs. Victims of rape often blame themselves and are shamed for having lost their virginity making them impure and unfit for marriage. Silence is often the only option.   After the rapes, many victims devote their lives to religion in an attempt to deal with their shame and trauma.  Some victims, in an attempt to adhere to their religious beliefs, accept marriage proposals from their rapists.  Other victims leave their villages in fear of further attacks.

Zahau further reports that in an effort to further “Burmanization,” the regime supports Burmese soldiers raping Chin women. Burmese soldiers are promised 100,000 kyat should they marry an educated Chin woman.   Yet, Chin women who marry Burmese soldiers have no legal protection.  If their spouse and/or father of their children abandon them, they have no legal recourse and are forced to raise their children without any financial support; while living in shame within their communities. Brutal beatings and gang rape is also a form of punishment for women who the Burmese authorities suspect supporting insurgent groups.

Kachin women’s rights groups have also issued a report, “Driven Away” which focused on the rape of women and girls in the Kachin State.  First, soldiers rape these girls who often opt to escape into China.  Some girls are sold to work in brothels or to become of the wives of Chinese men.  One young girl explains that her own aunt-a drug addict sold her to a trafficker.  She managed to escape and returned home.  Many others, however, disappear or are found murdered.  The Burmese regime has made no efforts to stop the trafficking of women. (Kachin Women’s Association, Thailand 1999)

Shan women’s organization also published a report, “License to Rape” in which they illustrated dozen of rape cases of Shan women by Burmese soldiers.  Their report mentioned migration after rape.  It reads, “In twenty-two of the cases documented (13%), the women, with or without their families, moved to Thailand following the rape. In some of these cases, the women moved immediately after the rape, in fear of further assault. In one of these cases, the 18-year-old woman was encouraged to leave by the village headman: Worried for her safety, he told her, ‘If you have a place to go, you should go. If you have a place to move, you should move. You shouldn’t face those soldiers again.’ And so Naang Yin (not her real name) stayed on the move, spending each night at a different relative’s house. Her parents were anxious about her security, but they didn’t dare complain to the military for fear of repercussions. Ten days after her release (from detention and gang rape), Naang Yin’s mother took her to Thailand. (Case 133).“

Other reports of rape are replete.  The trauma of rape or the mere fear of rape forces girls and women to flee.  In some cases, such in the case of the Arakanese, entire communities flee to Bangladesh.  That is, although these women and/or communities are not murdered outright, they are still being cleansed out of Burma.  Hence, clearly it is simply a matter of concealed ethnic cleansing.

Religious Persecution

Under the umbrella of forced migration as a means of ethnic cleansing also falls Religious Persecution.  One method of attacking the minorities’ religion, recently reported by the Women’s League of Chinland (Zahau 2006), is to force ethnic women to marry Burmese soldiers.  Many ethnic minorities such as the Chin and some of the Karen are Christian.  Hence, marrying a Burmese soldier means forfeiting her religious beliefs. Burmese soldiers are reportedly paid for marrying, and thus converting, an ethnic minority or a person who practices Christianity. On the other hand, according to Fisher (2006), many of these soldiers “convert” to Christianity temporarily, until they are asked to join a different post, in which case, they denounce Christianity often even leaving the wife and children abandoned.  Zahau further reports that although the ethnic community may be aware of the women’s situations, that their ‘husband’ abandoned them, they are no longer willing to accept her as a member of their community.  Hence, that woman is encouraged, internally (by herself) and by others to leave the community because she is no longer pure and thus, no longer a “good” Christian.   Although leaving the community may not destroy her ethnic identity, but it certainly will be difficult to maintain given that communication is virtually impossible in Burma.  Without continued interaction with her community, which fosters identity, she may eventually distance herself completely—as is reported by Zahau.

More open religious persecution perpetrated by the Burmese is the destruction of Christian symbols.  A non-governmental organization, the Chin Human Rights Organization (CHRO) reported that in 2005, a giant Christian cross on a mountaintop in one of the ethnic minority districts was destroyed by Burmese troops.  It was destroyed on direct order of the highest-ranking military commanders in the region. After destroying the 50-foot cross, Burmese soldiers hoisted a massive Burmese flag in its place and announced plans to build a Buddhist pagoda on that site in the near future.

There is also a Muslim Ethnic minority in Arakan, in the southwestern region of Burma, otherwise known as the Rohinga.  The Rohingas have experienced decades of discrimination and have been forced to flee into Bangladesh primarily because of their religious orientation. The Rohinga have reportedly suffered from systematic rape, which has caused entire communities to flee into neighboring Bangladesh (Zahau 2005).   The government refuses to give citizenship status to Muslim Rohingas because there is no recorded history of their ancestors having occupied Burma during British rule.  

There have been further reports that Muslims residing in the capital of Rangoon suffer religious persecution as well.  In 2001, it was reported that several men from the Arakan State were forced off a bus and imprisoned.  Some were sentenced to seven years in prison for travelling without proper identification papers.   In 2001, a Muslim man was taken off a plane in Kawthaung airport in southern Burma, bound for Rangoon without apparent reason; his ticket was cancelled.    Clearly, again, these Muslim ethnic minorities are discriminated against, have their identities attacked and are forced to migrate to avoid further persecution, the rape of their women, or worse risk of incarceration and even death.

The primarily Buddhist Burmese military does not only persecute differing religions, they in fact, persecute other fellow Buddhists as well — ethnic minority Buddhists.  In the case of the Shan, which are located in the central eastern region, Burmese military soldiers have reportedly slipped old shoes and underwear into the wet concrete of pagoda constructions to defile the purity of the temple (Fisher, 2006).  Hence, religious persecution is a significant means of ethnic persecution not only for ethnic minorities who are Christians or Muslim, but for the Buddhist ethnic minorities as well.  Religious persecution is an effective means of attacking identity-forcing minorities to leave their regions, individually or collectively.  Once they are out of their territories, it is extremely difficult for them to maintain identity.  One reason is that once they are disconnected from their “motherlands”, they are no longer permitted to speak in their mother tongues and are forced to take on Burmese names—further forfeiting their sense of identity (Mirante, 1993, 2005; Fink 2001; Carey, 1999).

Eminent Domain
Another means of ethnic cleansing through forced migration is the regime’s claim of its “eminent domain.”  Burma is rich in natural resources such as lush forests and minerals.   Most natural resources are located in ethnic minority regions.  These regions are also important for the regime in that it lays oil pipelines from and to the Yunnan region of China. Natural gas pipelines are laid in the Arakan State. The government often relocates entire towns displacing whole communities in order to claim the resources or the land.

Recently the Chinese government bought mineral rights to Chin State’s Mwe Taung mining area.  in order to harvest the precious and semi-precious minerals.   Recently, natural gas was discovered in the Arakan region in Eastern Burma.  Ethnic minorities are being forced out of their regions.  Gas and oil pipelines now run through towns and land mines are laid to “protect” the pipelines.  In fact, it keeps ethnic minorities from returning home to their villages.  They are forced to migrate and become displaced either inside Burma or they migrate into neighboring Bangladesh.

The forest is also considered “eminent domain” by the regime and deforestation is prevailing in Burma.  A Chin pastor explains, “There is a forest about six miles from a village called Tlauhmun. We call it Aikon forest. It’s a forest that has grown for probably hundreds of years. In 1999-2000 the military forced the people to cut down all these trees. The military had the trees sawed into planks for building. Then they sell the planks and get the money. They sold the lumber to the Public Works Department, which is also a government agency. They used it for bridges – but this “hual” wood is not good for bridges, so in a year or two the wood gets rotten. The vicious cycle goes on. The military get the money for their living. Sometime last year, [a man] was forced to move a log, but he could not because the log was too big. So they shot him, but he did not die. The government gives permits to businessmen, mostly Chinese, to cut the wood, and take the gold and cane for trading. Because of the logging and mining, most of the mountains and the hillsides have been emptied of forests. Everything’s changed, even the wildlife. In the past we heard the sounds of wildlife. But no more. They all ran away. You can hardly see any wild animals in the area anymore.”    Eventually the people, like the wildlife, will have to leave their territories as well.  Johanson (2003) argues that the “…indigenous people in Burma…have been impressed into slave labor to harvest the world’s last sizable forests of teak by the country’s military rulers…[who have] been logging roads to allow access for oil and gas exploration in indigenous homelands.  Many of these forests are home to rare species, such as the Asian Rhino, Asian Elephant among others, as well as the aforementioned indigenous peoples.” (p. 1)
Undocumented Cases of Concleaned Ethnic Cleansing

There are other undocumented incidentes such as the above.  Again, because journalism is prohibted and because Burma is extremely isolated, documentation is difficult.  However, based on reports stemming inside Burma, other similar cases are and have occurred.  For example, forced labor is still occuring.  It is reported that 5000 ethnic minorites were rounded up in Myitkyina, the capital of the Kachin State for forced labor.   They were abducted at a Cinema.  It is said that only 500 survived the forced labor.

Forced migration is also occuirng in concert with ecological destruction.  The BBC—Asia reported in 2006 that in Kachin State, thousands of acres of forest has been plundered.  Litteraly it was reported that, “…in Kachin State, seven days on foot is now deforsted…”

Ecological destruction as a means of forced migration is also reported in the Shan State.  Shan ethnic minorities are rounded up and warehoused until needed for forced labor.

In the whole of the country, HIV infected soldiers are said to be taken to ethnic minority territories to spread the deadly virus.  The same means of ethnic cleansing was employed when the Americas were invaded.  Blankets infested with yellow fever were given to the Indians knowing that they would perish when infected.   

Finally it is said that in the future, the Karen will only be featured in museums.

Conclusion

As mentioned above, Burma’s military has only one real and actual enemy, the ethnic minorities.  These ethnic minorities were forced to join the Union of Burma after independence from the British. They ethnic minorities did not then nor do now, identify as Burmese. They view themselves as separate independent groups with inalienable rights. The ethnic minorities occupy areas rich in natural resources. The Burmese, being the majority, have taken control of the country and are engaged in ethnic cleansing. Instead of committing mass murder, however, the regime employs concealed methods of ethnic cleansing.  That is, it realizes the power of the international community and therefore operates systematically and under concealment to cleanse itself of the ethnic minorities.

The regime employs, among others, three means of ethnic cleansing.  First, they do not engage in overt mass murders.  Instead they “use” the ethnic minorities as land mine sweepers and forced laborers, literally and actually exhausting them.  The regime, perhaps having learned from other historical events, staunchly prohibits foreign journalists.  Another means the regime manages to avoid international attention is by practicing isolationism.  That is, although it is a member of ASEAN, Burma’s regime appreciates the non-intervention policy.  Burma’s military regime is trying to avoid another Kosovo where the UN intervened.  So, although they agree to dialogue with neighboring countries, even including Aung San Suu Kyi, it refuses to address Human Rights violations let alone ethnic cleansing.  

A more insidious means of forced migration to achieve ethnic cleansing, is the overt rape.  Rape and the mere fear of rape causes entire communities to flee.  Religious persecution is also a horrific means of ethnic cleansing and forced migration. The regime also cuts ethnic minorities off from their territories by cutting their “ties” to the soil.  Finally, the regime claims that everything within the borders of the Union of Burma is their eminent domain.  Hence, they claim territories, relocate entire towns, or displace large communities.  

Human Rights organizations as well as Non-governmental Organizations have focused on Burma for over 60 years, yet little has changed.  Burma seems to offer little to the world in terms of resources.  Although it was once one of the richest countries in Southeast Asia, it no longer has much to offer the international community, other than, perhaps China.  Further, interest from scholars has paled.  Those in the business of studying areas are declining in number (van Schendel, 2001).  That is, the Burmese regime has cleverly “left the map”.  By doing so, the regime continues to operate under concealment and may, literally, achieve its end of ethnic cleansing.

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By Dr. Vum Son

The Union of Burma is the amalgamation of formerly independent kingdoms of Arakan, Burma, and Mon; princely states of the Shan and Karenni; chiefdoms of the Chin and Kachin; and independent communities of the Karen. The Union of Burma was formed by the Panglong agreement of the Chin, Kachin, Shan, and the Burman. However, the agreement encompasses the Arakanese, Mon, Karenni, and Karen, who were proud nations and communities and who had distinct and unique identities different from the Burman, Chin, Kachin, or Shan.

In the constitution drafted in 1947, Bogyoke Aung San promised the non-Burman equality and autonomy. After the death of Aung San, however, U Nu and the AFPFL amended the draft constitution, betraying both the letter and spirit of the Panglong agreement. The amendments invalidated the recognition of the formerly proud nations of Arakan, Chin, Kachin, Karen, Karenni, Mon, and the Shan. Therefore serious trouble was looming for Burma at independence.

Shortly after Burma’s independence in 1949, the Karen, followed by several other non-Burman nationalities, rose up in arms to fight for independence. At the height of the Karen rebellion and underground movement of the communists, soldiers defected en masse from the Burma Rifles and other army units (e.g., the Karen Rifles). Out of the five battalions of Burma Rifles only about two thousand soldiers were loyal to the union government. Because of the Karen rebellion, the government forced numerous non-Burman holding key positions in the army to retire. Among those forced to retire were General Smith Dun, the Commanding Officer of the Burma Army, Saw Shi Sho, the chief of the air force, Brigadier Saw Kya Doe, chief of operations, and all Karen nationals, to name a few. These positions were then assigned only to ethnic Burman. General Ne Win, a Sino-Burman and a member of the “Thirty Comrades” became the Commanding Officer of the Burma Army. He was also made the Defense Minister of the Union government.

General Ne Win became ambitious and requested to be made the Prime Minister. The civilian government dismissed him back to the barracks. Ne Win realized that to become the Prime Minister of Burma or to be able to run the country, he needed to be the commanding officer of a large army, and from that day on he worked on a scheme that eventually made him the oppressor of the peoples of Burma for forty years. That scheme might be called the “Ne Win Doctrine.”

Premise of the Ne Win Doctrine:

To become the ruler of the country as the commanding officer of the Burma Army, the army must be large and strong. The requisite for having a strong army is that the army must have a strong and sizeable enemy.

How could the Burma Army have a strong enemy? The answer lies in the history of Burma and the history of the members of the Union of Burma.

History of Ethnic Conflict

There are no known facts about the ethnic conflicts prior to the Burmese King Anawrahta, who became king in the eleventh century. Long before the Burman descended from the high regions of Tibet and northwestern China to the present Burma in the seventh or eight century AD, the Mon had established their kingdom in lower Burma, the Chin in Upper Burma, and the Arakanese in Arakan. Our knowledge of Burman history started with the king Anawrahta because of the aggressiveness of the Burman, who in the course of time attacked and were attacked by Arakan, Mon, and Shan. The history of the Thai, Assamese, and Meitei (Manipuris) describes the immense cruelty of the Burman forces. Because of their notoriaty, historians concentrated on the Burman history and unjustly gave little attention to the history of the other groups in the region. This one-sided view of history has had a catastrophic effect on the modern relationships between the ethnic groups because the Burmese military can convince outsiders that there is only the history of the Burman and the other people are anonymous.

In fact, there were many ethnic conflicts among the peoples that constitute Burma today. Most notably, the Burman and the Mon engaged in a great contest of power against each other. To a lesser extent, extended wars were fought between Arakan and Burma, and Shan against the Burman. The Karen apparently did not establish a powerful enough system to challenge the Burmese leadership, but they were subjected to high taxation and forced to work for the Burman. The Burman had no interest, authority, or influence on the outlying areas, such as the Chin, Naga, and Kachin. In all their wars, the opponents of the Burman know them as most brutal, and most cruel. The brutality and cruelty of the Burmese Army in post-colonial Burma has only carried on the tradition of Burman behavior.

Development of the Doctrine

With the mistrust and turbulent history between the Burman and the non-Burman, Ne Win had the means by which to create a powerful enemy that would justify a large army for him to command. Thus, he created the Ne Win doctrine.

Ne Win Doctrine:

Create an enemy of the non-Burman by driving them to military resistance. Drive them to military resistance by exploiting the political unrest in Burma.

The political situation facilitated Ne Win’s plan to exacerbate the non-Burman and Burman mistrust. As soon as the Union of Burma was formed, the AFPFL, who dominated the politics of Burma, initiated ethnic conflict. The AFPFL betrayed the Panglong agreement by adopting a quasi-federal constitution. Although the constitution allowed some non-Burman nationalities the status of national states, the constitution gave the power of the state to the central government, which was the government of proper Burma or the government of the Burman. The states were governed by the central government, with no possible self-determination. They were practically the colonies of the Burman. The constitution refused to recognize the Mon and the Arakanese statehood, denying them recognition as a distinct ethnic group. The constitution also declared the Burman language as the common language, marginalizing the non-Burman nationalities.

Furthermore, when Ne Win assumed the post of commanding officer, U Nu, the prime minister of Burma, proclaimed martial law in some regions of the Shan state in response to the formidable Karen forces scattered in many parts of Burma including the Shan State. However, the Karen were severely beaten at Insein and were no longer a threat to the government of Burma by the mid-fifties. General Ne Win needed the continuation of the Karen rebellion and other existing civil wars to maintain the strength of the Burma Army. Therefore, the Burma Army units created renewed hatred for the Burman by roaming Karen villages to create victims. Thus began the implementation of the Ne Win Doctrine, making the non-Burman fear and hate the Burman and leading them to armed resistance.

Implementation of the Doctrine

The main feature of the doctrine was to make the Burma Army above the law wherever there was insurgency or rebellion. The army could do whatever they wanted in the countryside where there were disturbances. But its purpose was never to quell rebellion. The people had no rights whatsoever. As soon as the Burma Army came to an area, the people lost their rights to their land, property, and even their own children. Worst of all, they lost the right to their own lives. On the other hand, the officers and men of the army could do whatever they wanted. From stealing the property of the people, beating the people, raping the women, and killing people singularly or en masse, they do not have to report to any other authority. They were not accountable to any law and there was no authority the people to complain to. The Burma Army was an independent entity. The people, if they dared, could complain to the army authorities who had laid out the policies and had drawn up the guidelines for these atrocities. Their policies were to make the people hate them. If there were complaints by the people that meant the people had not learned their lesson. It meant more brutality towards the community.

The army came mainly to dehumanize the people regardless whether they belong to the rebels or not. They were treated as if they were animals. The army was the law. These brutalities produced endless atrocities. And these brutalities and atrocities brought incalculable damage to the army’s credibility and to national unity. The soldiers were seduced by the power of their guns and the tacit encouragement from their superiors. They adhered to the philosophy of being invincible and they created wars where there were none before. The result was racial hatred.

The army usually came to villages fully informed about the people. The Burma Army units usually came after a battle was fought between the rebel group and the Burma Army. They had knowledge about the men from the village who were in the rebellion. Usually the army called all the villagers to a meeting ground, usually a football field and executed a popular leader of the community. The person was executed not because he was an enemy of the Burma Army but because the Burma Army had learned that by doing so, they forced the recruitment of youngsters to the rebel army, thereby creating a large enemy for the Burma Army. If Burma Army soldiers had died in the battle with the rebel group, the army unit came to the villages to punish the people of the villages. The army then killed civilians from these villages at least double in number of the soldiers killed at the battle.

The doctrine was to deepen the suspicion and hatred that existed between the non-Burman and the Burman in pre-colonial and British Burma. It was to create hatred among the non-Burman against the Burman because the Burma Army was run by the Burman. Officers and men of the Burma Army treated the population with cruel, humiliating, and degrading inhuman practices. When the army units come to villages they went from house to house and took anything they wanted. They killed domestic animals to substantiate their eager rations. The army encouraged Burman soldiers to marry the non-Burman women. The soldiers were made to understand that to molest and rape women in the “disturbed” areas was no crime. There was no punishment for such misdeeds. The army burned villages and were instructed to destroy and burn Christian churches and Muslim mosques. During the communist rebellion non-Burman class battalions were sent to areas controlled by the communist. These class battalions destroyed Buddhist temples and killed the people including women and children. The point was to make the Burman hate the non-Burman. The army employed forced labor in disturbed areas which were created by the Army itself. The army demanded porters from the villages who were not paid. It was forced porter conscription. One of the main reasons for all of this cruel treatment was the forever prolongation of the civil war. Without the civil war a strong Burma Army was not necessary. Only cruel treatment of the people guaranteed the continuation of armed rebellion.

Results of the Doctrine on the non-Burman

In all of the civil conflicts in Burma, even during parliamentary democracy, the Burma Army sought military solutions to their problems. Putting an end to the rebellion would have been easy if a political solution had been sought. Instead, the Burma Army was systematically campaigning for hate. The hatred of the military by the people guaranteed the increase of volunteers for the non-Burman ethnic rebellion. After the campaign of hate for 10 years, there was a strong rebellion in Burma that a strong enough army was created to contain the rebellion. Ne Win fostered this strong rebellion by applying the doctrine to each of the ethnic groups in Burma.

Karen

The Karen lived side-by-side with the Burman in the delta region and had suffered atrocities under Burman kings. During the rule of Burmese kings, the relationship between Karen and Burman was not friendly. Karens suffered under high taxation and racial discrimination. There was always animosity between the two communities. Although living side-by-side, the Karen and Burman seldom intermarried because of the hate existing between them. There had always been a racially-motivated segregation between the Burman and the Karen. They stood on opposite sides of the firing line when the Japanese invaded Burma during WW II. They committed atrocities against each other and the animosity between them further deepened. The Karen did not want to be a part of independent Burma. However they lived intermingled with the Burman and a solution to their problems was difficult to solve. Britain refused to listen to the Karen’s demand for separation from the Burman.

Because the Karen were honest and trustworthy, the British hired them into their armed forces and civil administration. At the end of WW II, the Karen dominated both of these parts of government. When independence was eminent for Burma after the end of the war, the Karen sought all avenues available to them to separate themselves from the Burman, but they failed. In 1949, the Karen formed the Karen National Defense Organization to protect Karen villages from the Burman. The formation of this organization started the Karen rebellion in 1949.

The Karen and communist defections in the army left only a small army contingent loyal to the government. In other words, the Karen at one time were close to taking the capital Rangoon. The few remaining Chin and Kachin rifles battalions stood their ground and saved the Rangoon government from falling. The Karen were driven out of Insein, a satellite Karen town of Rangoon.

Thus the Karen situation could explode anytime unless they could agree with the Burman on terms to build a state together.

General Ne Win and his officers never wanted peace. The Karens could have easily been beaten if a political solution had been sought. The Burmese government refused to discuss the Karen problems with Karen leaders. It was left to the military to solve the Karen problem. The Burma Army could have beaten the Karen rebellion if they had fought with good intentions. Often times Chin or Kachin forces of the Burma Army had beaten Karen units. When the Chin units thought that they could eliminate the Karen unit, the Chin Rifles were ordered to withdraw by the War Office in Rangoon. The Karen units were allowed to regroup. The Karen survived with mounting losses in life and material, and Ne Win continued to build his army with the excuse of the Karen threat.

The last stronghold of the Karen at Manarplaw was not attacked for over twenty years because the Burma Army wanted to show that they had a strong enemy. Only when Manarplaw became the second capital of Burma, where all democracy-loving people assembled, and the international media was informed of the brutality of the Burma did the Burma Army feel the need to attack. Manarplaw was not easily taken, but for a two-hundred-thousand strong army to beat a fifteen-thousand men army should not be that difficult a task.

Arakan and Mon

Arakan and Mon were independent nations before they were overrun by Burman kings. Because these people were colonies of the Burman for a long period of time, and because they were Buddhists and intermarried with the Burman, the Burman leadership believed that they were already absorbed into Burman society. The Burman leadership therefore found no reason to negotiate with the people of Arakan and Mon. On the other side, the Arakanese and Mon felt that they had been freed from Burman colonialization when the British gave independence to the Union of Burma. In independent Burma they wanted the recognition of their unique ethnic national identity and their rights as a nation. But the Burman leadership completely miscalculated the nationality feelings and endeavor of the Arakan and Mon.

Like the Karen, the Mon and Arakanese had been at war with the Burman before the British came. During those wars, the Burman treated both the Mon and Arakanese brutally. The people of Mon and Arakan regarded the British occupation of their land as the end of Burman colonialization. Ironically, the British introduction of schools and the teaching of Burmese in the schools was instrumental in transforming of the Arakan and Mon society into one much closer to the Burmese society. Although animosity and hatred existed between the Burman and Arakanese and Mon, they share the same religion and intermarry. The Arakanese and Mon could have easily been content if the Burman leadership had given them their rightful position in the society of the independent Union of Burma. Luckily for Ne Win, the Burman leadership, beginning with General Aung San, completely miscalculated the nationality feelings of the Arakanese and the Mon. They believed that the Arakan and Mon had fully and completely integrated into Burman society. The Burman leadership did not recognize their unique national identity. Therefore, an insurgency started at the end of 1946, even before independence was attained.

General Ne Win only needed a little push for the Arakanese and Mon to rise up in arms and mobilize their national feelings. Cases of atrocities committed against them as punishment for disturbances quickly intensified the hate of the Burman that already existed from the past. The Burma Army used small uprisings as an excuse to send a large contingent to terrorize villages that were situated in the nearby areas. The Burma Army simply applied the Ne Win doctrine. In response, the Arakan and Mon created an independence movement. General San Yu was the commander of the Burma Army contingent in Arakan for fifteen years before he became the president of Burma under the Ne Win’s Burma Socialist Program Party.

Karenni

The Karenni were independent when Burma was under colonialism, but when Burma became independent, the Karenni became a part of Burma (viz. a colony of Burma). Thus, without proper agreement for equality in the new independent state of Burma, the Karenni would always demand their rights and independence.

Like the Arakanese and Mon the Karenni fought to regain their independence just after Burma’s independence. Instead of realizing their goal of independence they were drawn into the Ne Win doctrine. As the Karenni rebellion grew, so did the army stationed in the Karenni state. The AFPFL authorities in Rangoon resorted to a military solution to the Karenni conflict, putting the fate of the people of the Karenni in the hands of the brutal Burma Army under Ne Win. He, of course, immediately applied his doctrine of making the people hate the Burman. Where the Burma Army set foot into any territory was to terrorize the inhabitants. The Karenni were no exception. The government of the AFPFL had created a new front for the Burma Army.

Shan

Unlike the Arakan, Mon, and Karen, the Shan had never been completely subjugated by the Burman in historic times. On the contrary, the Shan had at one time ruled the Burman. Historically, Burman and the Shan dealt with each other as equals and there was mutual respect for each other. The ruling Saophas were mostly well-educated and versed in politics and world affairs.

General Ne Win was able to extend his doctrine to the Federated Shan States when the Karen rebellion spilled over to Taungyi, the Shan capital, in 1950. Then the remnants of the Chinese Kuomintang (KMT) forces infiltrated the Shan State from China and gave the government even more reason to send troops there. The placing of most of the regions of the Shan state under martial law by the U Nu government delivered the Shans into the evil claws of Ne Win and his Burma Army, the Tatmadaw. The Burma Army saw the martial law as their god-sent opportunity to terrorize the Shan population. Among the Burman men, the fair-skinned Shan women were a prized commodity to exploit. When the General encouraged his soldiers to marry Shan women it was like a dream-come-true to the soldiers. The Burma Army gave promotions to those who married ordinary Shan women. Those who married Shan princess were made officers (if the soldier was a NCO). If the soldier was an officer, he received a double promotion. The purpose of the marriage policy was not purely the Burmanization of the Shan, but it was rather to reap hatred. The soldiers thus hunted Shan women for marriage or for other purposes. They ambushed Shan women on their way to their fields, and if the women tried to run, the soldiers would shoot at them. They killed some women and raped many. Shan women were so afraid of the Burma Army that they hid on seeing army vehicles. A Shan elderly said, “I could bear it when they took away my chicken, pigs, and my property. I could bear it when they burned down my house. But I cannot bear it when they abuse my wife and daughter in front of me.” The soldiers commonly looted Shan property and hunted their domestic animals to supplement their meager rations. Prominent and well-loved Shans disappeared without a trace. After ten years of the army presence, the Shan youth could not bear the oppression and degradation. The Shan youth, lead by university students, rose up in arms in the late fifties. By then many non-Burman ethnic groups had stood in arms against the Burma Army. Ne Win had once again driven the Shan to rebel against his army. The Ne Win doctrine was successfully implemented and was working in the Shan State.

The destruction of Shan society through opium was also mainly the work of Ne Win and the military. The growing of opium and the opium trade may have been started by the KMT and international drug smugglers, but the Burma Army was the authority in the Shan state. Without the tacit approval of the military, the opium production could not have continued. The Burma Army used the excuse that the military could not control opium production in the Shan state because of the Shan rebellion. This excuse was extremely misleading because, as explained above, the military was the cause of the rebellion. The military and Ne Win benefited by the drug trade because they were the main transporters of the drug inside Burma. A major aim of the Ne Win Doctrine was to destroy the Shan social establishment. The production of opium and heroin enhanced the implementation of the Doctrine, and Ne Win would apply this part of the doctrine elsewhere.

Kachin

The Kachin State is rich in natural resources. Many Kachin profited from the large jade deposits which are found in Kachinland. The Kachin served loyally in the British Burma Army and in post-independence Burma. There had never been problems with the Kachin until 1960. But soon U Nu came to the aid of Ne Win. During the election campaign in 1960, U Nu made an election promise to make Buddhism the state religion if he was given the mandate to govern Burma. He won the election and Buddhism did become the state religion. Because of these events, the Kachin formed the Kachin Independence Organization, initiating a rebellion against the ruling government of Burma. The Burma Army immediately applied the Ne Win doctrine in the Kachin state. By the time the Kachin Independent Army signed a cease-fire agreement after thirty years of civil war, Kachin villages had lost much of their previous relative wealth. Total destruction of the Kachin society and Kachin properties resulted and the Burma Army is in every corner of the Kachinland. The Kachin have traded their rights as human beings and their right to be treated as an equal by the Burman for a cease fire.

Communists and Wa

The Burman communists met the same fate as the non-Burma ethnic insurgency. Chin, Karen, Burman, and Kachin battalions were deployed to fight the communists. As with the Karen, the communists were attacked, allowed to regroup, and attacked again. Within a few years after independence, the communists were no longer a formidable force because, unlike the non-Burma ethnic groups, the Ne Win doctrine could not make the Burman hate the Burman, perhaps because they understood what the Burma Army was doing. Whenever the communists had a stronghold, the Burma Army terrorized the local people. When the villagers were tired of the harassment from the Burma Army and the taxation of the communists, they simply moved away. Unlike the non-Burman they did not have elaborate housing and they could easily farm somewhere else. The communist regained their momentum only when they moved to the Chinese border and persuaded the Wa to fight for them. When the Ne Win doctrine was applied to the Wa, the Wa started to hate the Burman of the Burma Army. The racial hatred transferred to hatred of their Burmese communist masters. They eventually overthrew the Burman communists and started an ethnic war against the Burman. Because of the huge assistance given by China to the Burma communist party, there were incentives for the Wa young men to join the communists. The price tag was high for the Wa. Almost every Wa household lost a son or a family member in the conflict. After the Wa signed the cease-fire agreement with the Burma Army, the Wa ran drug production and trade under more peaceful circumstances. Due to the Wa rebellion, a powerful contingent of the Burma Army was needed and the Burma Army fulfilled its purpose controlling the drug trade.

Chin

Historically, the Chin and the Burman did not have much contact. Their interaction was mostly limited to mutual raiding, including taking war prisoners as slaves. Being in the remote areas of the hills, the Chin were isolated from the valley-dwelling Burman. Consequently, they never dominated one another, or had any other diplomatic relations.

For forty years since joining the Burman, the Chin Hills continued on relatively quietly because there was no reason for the Ne Win army to go there. General Ne Win and most Burman had never been to the Chin Hills themselves, and perceived it to be a very primitive area whose simple inhabitants had neither the ability nor the will to develop their country. However, when Ne Win visited the Chin Hills in 1955 as the commanding officer of the Burma Army, he saw that the Chin were not as primitive as he had thought. Moreover, he realized that the Chin lived in bigger houses than the general Burman. Whereas most Burman lived in bamboo thatch houses, the Chin used wooden planks as walls with wooden floors and corrugated iron or slate as their roofs. Ne Win would wait and find a way to apply his doctrine.

In the late 1970s, the BSPP under Ne Win began to grow opium in the Chin Hills. They had found this strategy successful in the Shan State, where the army had been stationed since 1950. Army officers profited by transporting the drug and were able to addict many of the people by making the drug easily accessible. The Burman then could easily acquire their property.

The growing of opium in the Chin Hills in 1997 means nothing less than the ruin of the future of the Chin people. It was reported that heroin is being refined in Tahan, Tedim, and Tamu under the military supervision. This is clearly an attempt to destroy the Chin people in order to be able to control them. Until now Ne Win was incapable of making the Chin hate the Burman. Soon he will destroy the Chin people as more and more people become addicted to heroin.

The Chin were drawn to the same fate as other ethnic groups in only after the 1988 general uprising against the practice of the Ne Win doctrine in the whole of Burma. Three Chin men formed the Chin National Front (CNF) in 1985 in India. The CNF was formed as an armed independence movement and grew to about fifty members, mostly Chin students who fled to Mizoram in India. The CNF had no money, arms, or supporters in 1988, but its existence was enough to serve as an excuse for the Burma Army to destroy the Chin social establishment. In 1980 there was only a Burma Army company in the Chin Hills. By 1995 ten thousand Burma Army soldiers were stationed in the Chin Hills because the CNF had grown to about one hundred and fifty soldiers. The Burma Army came to the Chin Hills not necessarily to fight the CNF but to instill hatred and fear for the Burman consistent with applying the doctrine.

Results of the Doctrine on the Union

In 1958, after leading the Burma army for almost ten years, General Ne Win felt that his army was strong enough to overthrow the government of the Union of Burma under U Nu. Ne Win’s subordinates gave U Nu the ultimatum that the Burma Army was going to take over power either peacefully or by force. U Nu cleverly announced on the Burma Radio that he had requested General Ne Win to take over the administration of the country until the general election, which was to be held soon. Because such a transfer was legal under the 1947 constitution, the general attained what he wanted but was still bound by the constitution. However, at that time several high-ranking army officers opposed a military dictatorship. Once again General Ne Win had to go back to the barracks. Within a few months of his return, he forced out all the officers that might oppose his next attempt to take over.

Ne Win remained the prime minister as well as the commanding general of the Burma Army from 1958 to 1960. In that time, he steadily raised the strength of the army. At a conference in Taungyi in 1961, non-Burman parliamentarians and politicians, lead by Shan leaders, requested the amendment of the constitution, which would have given the non-Burman more autonomy in their affairs, equality among ethnic groups, less interference by the central government authorities in the non-Burman ethnic regions, and a fair distribution of the nation’s money. Ne Win understood what they wanted. If there was equality and peace in Burma he had no chance to ever rule the country.

By 1962, almost all the non-Burman ethnic groups were up in arms against the government of the union. All non-Burman ethnic people had only hatred and distrust for the Burman and the Burman-led government. By that time, General Ne Win had built a strong enough army to control the whole country at gunpoint. In March 1962, Ne Win staged a coup d’état and seized power. The future held more rebellion and more oppression to instill hatred. From a two-thousand man Burma Rifles plus two battalions each for the Chin and Kachin in 1950, the Burma Army rose to number 180,000 in 1988.

Ne Win’s Miscalculation: The Doctrine Worked too Well

The application of the Ne Win doctrine raised the non-Burman ethnic rebellion to approximately 60,000 soldiers in 1988. The end of the Burma Socialist Program Party and a mass pro–democracy uprising in 1988 paralyzed the government in Rangoon and the Burma Army was in a very weak position. They were short of arms and ammunition because they concentrated their fighting forces in the non-Burman ethnic areas. Moreover there were many high ranking officers who supported the pro-democracy movement. These officers refused the order to shoot into the crowd on September 1988. The result of the 1990 election showed clearly that the majority of the members of the armed forces were pro-democracy. Had the non-Burman army seized the opportunity and marched towards Rangoon, the Burma Army would have had no means nor will to defend the city.

“Big Father’s” Big Luck

The nightmare and catastrophe created by the Ne Win Dictatorship was the source of income and livelihood for many corrupted officials of the BSPP. Those who benefited from Ne Win’s dictatorship affectionately called him “Big Father.” Indeed, Ne Win took advantage of the foolishness of the non-Burman as well as the mainstream Burman line of thought. In 1988, the non-Burman passed up the only chance to defeat the Burma Army. As usual they kept to themselves and to their territory and never gained the aspiration to advance to Rangoon. At the moment that the Ne Win army was incapable of ruling the country, the Karen and the Mon were attacking each other for control of trade routes in their areas which brought in trade taxes. Not only did the non-Burman lose their only chance to table their demands for equality with an upper hand, they awakened Ne Win to the realization that he had made a wrong calculation. He was rescued by the incompetence of the non-Burman groups and the inability of leading Burman politicians to unite themselves into a force that could assume power.

Seeing he had miscalculated and nearly lost control, Ne Win immediately carried out what would prolong his grip on the population of Burma. His first step was to take Manarplaw. Manarplaw, the headquarters of the Karen National Union, had become the second capital of Burma. True to his doctrine, Ne Win did not attack the KNU capital for over twenty years, giving the Karen a sense of security. The existence of Manarplaw had been one of the excuses for Ne Win to build up his army. All forces opposing Rangoon had representatives in Manarplaw. Manarplaw served as headquarters for non-governmental organizations and international media to collect news items and facts, especially on the human rights abuses of the Ne Win regime. The realization that the non-Burman, together with the mass pro-democracy movement, could have taken over Rangoon brought Ne Win to the understanding that he needed to destroy Manarplaw.

In the past, Ne Win’s terms of peace had always been only “unconditional surrender,” knowing full well that the non-Burman freedom fighters would never give in. But after 1988, Ne Win had no choice. He undertook what he had never allowed himself in the past: he decided to sign cease-fire agreements with most of the non-Burman ethnic groups so that they would no longer pose a threat to his domain. He allowed the rebels to keep their arms and territory so he could continue to use them as an excuse to keep his large army to watch over these freedom fighters.

Ne Win also used the cease-fire agreements to gain access to the lucrative drug trade of the opium-growing Wa people. In the past the army was not directly involved in the drug trade. Drug traders were international drug smugglers, mostly Chinese. But the officers of the Burma Army were involved in transporting drugs. Whereas civilian drug carriers were subjected to searches, army convoys and transports were never bothered. Moreover the revenue and profits from the transportation were distributed among the officers. A captain would give a portion of his drug money to his boss, and that officer would share with his boss, and so on up the ladder. The cease-fire arrangement put opium transport and trade securely in the hands of the Burma Army. The SLORC’s announcements of confiscation of drugs and arrests of drug handlers in the government-controlled news media did not mean that the government was trying to stop the drug trade. The announcements were supposed to inform the people that the military government was serious about the elimination of the drug. In reality the military was trying to eliminate its competitors.

With this drug money, Ne Win improved the fighting ability of the Burma Army by buying over $1.4 billion worth of arms and ammunition from the Chinese. A convoy of trucks transported the arms and ammunition across the Burma-Chinese border for four months. Within five years, the Burma Army grew in size from 180,000 in 1988 to 400,000, making it the sixth largest army in the world. In the meantime, Burma became the poorest country in Asia and the sixth poorest in the world. Meanwhile, the SLORC reached its lowest point by becoming the worst human rights abuser in the world.

Conclusion

The Panglong agreement brought together different nationalities to form together the Union. When the Union of Burma drafted its constitution in 1947, the politics in Burma were dominated by the Anti–Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) of the Burman. This constitution betrayed the Panglong agreement, leading to dissatisfaction among the non-Burman nationalities, who chose to fight for their separation from the Burman. History has shown that a betrayal of an agreement can loose bloodshed and all the atrocities of war on the people. The peoples must decide whether they want to live in peace and prosperity by respecting one another, or to continue to dominate each other, which will be the continuation of the present nightmare in Burma.

Today after 35 years of Ne Win’s rule and the practice of the doctrine, there is so much hatred between the nationalities. The non-Burman blame the Burman for the suffering they endured under the Ne Win dictatorship because they see the leadership under Ne Win dominated by the ethnic Burman. The Burman on the other hand feel no responsibility because they likewise are suffered under the Ne Win dictatorship and blame Ne Win and the Burma Army for the ills of Burma. It is therefore impossible to agree on any agenda that might bring the non-Burman and Burman together. It will take many long years, even under democracy to bring the nationalities together, in mutual respect and understanding. Until and unless the Ne Win doctrine is destroyed, the future of the Union of Burma is doomed. The destruction of the Ne Win Doctrine can be accomplished only by working together, non-Burman and Burman alike towards an honest and trusting relationship.

Rev. Dr. Chum Awi

The genealogy of the Chin, according to the linguists, stems from Sino- Tibetan which is one out of three language groups, i.e., Altaic, Indo-European, and Austro-Asiatic. Sino-Tibetan gave birth to Tibeto- Burman which in turn gave birth to Tibetan, Yi( Lolo ), Pui( Minchia), TuChia, Hani( Woni), Lisu, Lahu, Nasi(Moso), Chingpo(Kachin), Chiang( Chin), Nu, and Tulung ( see Encyclopedia Britanica). Early writers, both British and Americans, mentioned the name of the Chins as Khang, Khiang or whatsoever. The words Chin, Chiang or Khiang were romanization of the original Chinese word ” Yin.”

The Chins are found in India, Bangladesh, and in Burma. There are Chins who live in plain areas and those who live on mountains have a word “zo” to describe places which are high and cold. Some Chins are propagating “zo-mi” as their original name. In fact, the genetic word “Chin” comes from the Chinese word “Yin” which means man. In the Pinyin romanization, “Yin” becomes ” Chin.” Thus, we have China as the country of the Yin people. culturally and traditionally, the Chins have many kinds of similarities with the Chinese. Sine 1889, the year in which the British empire annexed the Chin Hill, there were British political officers and American missionaries who have closely worked for the Chins. Some of these officers have remarks on the culture, way of life, attitude, habits, body structure, etc., of the Chins.

The ”Chin today are widespread in several other countries mainly because of their ill – feeling against the prevailing military rulers. It is necessary to introduce the Chins to other people for the purpose of mutual understanding and interpersonal relationship. To serve this purpose, this article depicts the remarks made by the British political officers and the American missionaries. The first person who made a remark on the Chins was Rev. Arthur Carson who lived and worked for the Asho- Chin in Thayer Myo. In his letter dated January 19, 1888 to the headquarters office of the Baptists in the United States of America, he wrote: There are so many dialects that we can never hope to know and use them all. Our hopes for the future are high. We find them naturally a superior people to the Burmans. They are not quarrelsome, may easily be taught to be independent and manly, and has a sense of gratitude for favors received. They have good mind and hearts capable of great love. Yet, they are just as capable as enmities as of friendships. The greatest evil we will have to meet among them is temperance.

A British medical officer Major Newland who himself married a Chin woman in Hakha town wrote a book called A Practical Handbook of Lai Dialect ( 1895). In his book he wrote: A Chin id manly and independent fellow. He has not the cringing, fawning habits of his neighbours the Burmans . He always considers himself the equal of anyone. This independent spirit is the only favorable quality of a Chin. He would be a fine fellow but for his drinking habits. Carey and Tuck, who expedited the Chin Hills, wrote volumes of book which they entitle The Chin Hills ( 1896). In their entitled one can find the following verses:

The slow speech, the serious manner, the respect of birth and the knowledge of pedigrees, the duty of revenge, the taste for and the treacherous method of hospitality, the clannish feeling, the vice of avarice, the filthy state of the body, mutual distrust, impatience under control, the want of power of combination and the continued effort, arrogance in victory, speedy discouragement and panic in defeat . . . The Chin Hills are peopled by many clans and communities, calling themselves to be distinct and superior origin . . . Owning firstly to the want of a written language and secondly to the intermiable inter-village warfare, has split up and resulted in Babel of tongues, a variety of customs, and a diversity of modes of living . . . Except in the prosecution of warfare, robbery is practically unknown. A.S. Reid in his book Chin -Lushai land observed the culture of the Chins as:

Owning no central authority, possessing no written language, obeying but the verbal mandates of the chiefs, Hospitable and affectionate in their homes unsparing of age and sex while on war path; Untutored as the remotest races in central Africa, and yet endowed with an intelligence. Rev. Dr East, a medical missionary to the Chin in the 1890s, called the Chins as ” splendid people.” His remarks is bases on what he found the existence of God in the hearts, words, and attitudes of the Chins. His diary was compiled in a book form and called it Burma Manuscripts (1910). He wrote: I was led to believe that these people had no knowledge God, no word of love, no word of home. However, I could not accept that ideas as I very thoroughly believe in racial unity and that God made all man out of one blood. It is a certainty that the Chins believe in the God of Heaven as Creator. This knowledge is universal among them.

Rev. Dr Strait, an American Baptist missionary to the Chins stationing in Hakha, did not accept the idea that the Chins are so civilized. Rather. he praised the social system of the Chins as well as the skills of women who could weave a high quality silk showls, garments etc., still keeps the Chins silk showls as a valuable thing of the family. Rev Dr J.H Cope, who served the Lord for the Chins associating with the British administrators during 1908 till 1938, mentioned that the Chins have been living in a higher civilization in the past. He indicated that the living situation on the hills makes constant deterioration of the prevailing culture. He wrote a book called Awakening of the Northern Chins. In his book he wrote:

There are evidences that these people once had a higher civilization. This is seen from the fact that they are completely clothed and do not appear ever to have been headhunters or cannibals. There is even a tradition of a written language. They differ from many hill tribes in that violent crime is rare polygamy not very common, women more respected, and warfare carried on less brutally than in many hill districts . . . After reaching the hills they quickly spread out in little villages in the narrow valley and many dialects soon developed.

Rev. Sowards, Secretary of American ( Burma) Baptist Missionary Society during 1950s prophesized that the Chins will make great contributions to the whole of Burma. He played a leading role in the forming of Zomi( Chin) Baptist Convention and a theological in 1953. School and Hospitals opened for the Chins by British governors and American missionaries opened the eyes of the Chins in many ways. The British administrators recruited the Chins for their army because they knew that they were faithful and dutiful. Today, the Chins are working hard for their seif identity, self- determination, self- dependency, and self-reliance. The only thing that they need to gain the above is freedom which can bring chance for them

Kanbawza Win

August 10, 2002

Even as India was pre occupied in the West vis a vis Pakistan over Kashmir and Jammu, its Northeast Frontier was not as peaceful as it seems. The Northeast militant like the NSCN, the ULFA, the PLA and the UNFL are still there, and off and on are making their presence felt. Currently the Assam Rifles is keeping it vigil over the 400 km of common border with Burma’s Chin State where the Chin refugees, in fleeing from the persecution of the Burmese army, used to cross to a save haven in the state of Mizoram. This is the latest phenomenon, which every interested party should handle with care.

Due to the ethnic cleansing policy, every Burmese ethnic nationality, if given a chance, flee to the neighboring countries including India where they will be save from arson, pillaging, rape (which has become so prominent that the US is forced to take action), forced relocation, forced labor and religious persecution. Obviously these unfortunate Chins are not recognized as refugees, as India would not hear of inaugurating another UNHCR office in the Northeast frontier (one in Kashmir is more than enough). This attitude gives a free hand to the Mizoram State government in Aizawl.

At first the Mizos welcome this Chin influx as they belong to the same tribe, same language and same religion. The common reminisce was that because of the British colonial division the Chin are forced to be on the Burmese side while Mizos are on the India side when in fact they were one. But the Burmese refugees whether they are Chin or Burmese (from Sagaing division), are hard working, more intelligent and have an economic vision and within a couple of years began to dominate the Mizo economy. Soon a black market thrives supplemented by a newly constructed road on the Burmese side given by the Indian government. The Burmese refugees knowing the plight at home began to engage in manual labor, hand looming, small business so much so that in Aizawl big market (Bara Bazaar) every shop can speak Burmese. Obviously jealousy began to creep into once a peaceful Mizoram society.

The problem became more confused when the bad elements of Mizo joined hands with the bad elements of Chin refugees and started the moon shining business. Consuming liquor is a big crime in medieval Mizo where an orthodox churches still wields much power. These became more complicated when the politicians from influential political parties such as Mizo National Front, Congress Party and the likes began to woo the Chins, promising them citizenship provided they vote for them in the elections. The winning candidate was happy but the loser now began to point its finger to the Chin refugees. Obviously patience runs out and the situation became to such ahead that mass repatriation of Chin refugees was enforced.

The driving forced behind the Mizoram State Government was the Young Mizo Association. (YMA). How come that this darling of Mizo, the YMA has transformed itself into the Red Guards of Mizoram is of interest. Initially it was a non-political, voluntary organization established since 1935 but soon it members rose to 250,000 having over 700 branches in Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Nagaland and Tripura. They initiated several social projects such as literacy campaigns, ecological drive, and residential quarters for poor, the guardian angel of Mizo cultural and heritage, cleanliness drive and most important fighting drugs and liquor. They also organize sports and social activities and see to it that the elections are free and fair so much so that the Indian Central government has to award them Indira Priyadarshini Vrikshamitra Award in 1986 and the Indira Gandhi Paryanvara Purushar Award in 1993. In other words they are a perfect organization in their own tiny medieval world. Visiting Aizawl, I recollect the Cramford Society of England who was all quite satisfied staying in their own cocoon.

But the world is changing, it has reached a modern era where globalization has come knocking at it doors and may come in whether invited or not. One cannot stay like an ostrich that bury its head on seeing a storm approaching. Maybe an episode like Commodore Perry with his black ships came forcing the doors of the Tokugawa Shogunate of Japan, is needed. On this side of the border the persecution of the Burmese Junta, especially the religious persecution meted out to the Chin Christian had hit hard on Mizoram. Forcing the Chins to become Buddhist and imprisoning the Christian pastors and priests or preventing the young Chin from attending the Christian seminaries compounded with the four cut policy of burning the barns of the Chin farmers compelled the Chins to flee en masse into Mizoram. The Mizo did not know that it is a crime to take in the Bible into Burma if it is written in Burmese or any ethnic languages.

Of course all these will be very hard for a Miozo to comprehend as the chairperson of YMA explain it to me “This is our land, our culture, our heritage and we have our own laws and it is our historical duty to protect them.” That is exactly “the monarch of all I survey” attitude, which Alexander Selkirk has described. Nobody will be fool hardy enough to argue that hypothesis. But repatriating these unfortunate Chin refugees en masse into the waiting jaws of the Burmese Army tantamount to human rights violations which itself is against the accepted norm of a civilized society.

Even if the YMA cannot comprehend the International Law and Universal Declarations of Human rights at least they should take a leaf out Mao Zedong’s Red Guards of the 60s, which is now going down as the darkest chapter of modern Chinese history. After all China is their neighbor and the leaders of the YMA should refrain themselves from becoming Red Guards such as replacing the town and village administration, taking the law into their own hands and uprooting the people. The Mizoram churches, as any medieval Church seems to forget the Genesis that God created everybody including the Chin condone this business of forced repatriation.

It has to be remember that the Mizo state economy crop up very much not only from the dole out of the Indian Central Government in New Delhi (and yet the Mizo regards the Indians as foreigners and refused them to let them in, unless there is an inner line permit) but also because of the Burmese refugees especially the Chin who took up all the hard work which are 3Ds (dirty, dangerous & degrading works) which no Mizo would do with half the pay of an average laborer. Indeed a young Mizo should thank the Chin for implementing this work.

This darling of Mizo should maintain its darling status and let not power corrupts them. At least they should not be carried on with the Mizo society where corruption is so rampant that Johnny Walker whisky is easily available in Aizawl, when every body knows that the Chins are not sophisticated enough to distill that category of liquor. Truckloads of foreign liquors and cheap Chinese consumer goods are driven from Burma, thanks to the road constructed by India, while the customs and the police look the other way. Perhaps the YMA should. read a chapter of power corruptness of what Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the Burmese Nobel Laureate has beautifully written in her, “Freedom from Fear.” Besides they should recollect that Chins are their brethren who will live side by side in perpetuity because of geographical proximity and that Burma will not be forever under the military dictatorship. One day when they go back to their own land we want them to have fond memories of Mizo and not the Red Guards of Mizoram who forced them out of the frying pan into the fire. If that day ever arrived, I am sure the Mizo will be happy to live in their own cultural pond pretending to have never heard of the vast ocean outside.

Kanbawza Win

” Hope for the Best but Prepare for the Worst” is the unforgotten speech given by our beloved leader Bogyoke Aung San when he came to London to negotiate for independence of the Union of Burma. The speech implies that if we cannot achieve it by peaceful negotiations we will have to fight for it. Today this would also apply to all the ethnic forces in Burma who are at odds with the Burmese military Junta. Currently the secret negotiations between the pro democracy movement led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the military Junta has left out the ethnic forces. If the Myanmar race, both democratic and undemocratic forces construe the Non-Myanmar as an excess baggage that must be accepted as a necessary evil then the Burmese problem of will never be solved. Their actions seem to indicate a Burmese saying “Ka Lae Dwe Tait Tait Ne, Lu Gyi Dwe Sa Gar Pyaw Nae Dae” meaning, ‘Hey you little fellows keep quiet while we adult are seriously talking’. The nature of the so called ‘Secret Negotiations’ is a clear indication that there is something to hide from the public. If that is the case, then the ethnic groups will have to conclude that as the 1947 Constitution was torn up by the Burmese Junta in 1962 and obliterated up the Panglong Agreement then the ethnic groups have no obligation whatsoever to the Union. Hence fighting the Myanmar Tatmadaw (army) is amounted to legitimate war against an occupying force (for the past decade they have behave in such a manner) and cannot be construed as a civil war.

The very fact that the negotiations are bilateral and not tri-larteral underline the fact that the Myanmar tribe, which is a much stronger, more numerous and resourceful and dominating tribe, wants to rough ride shod over the ethnic groups. The writing on the wall exhibit clearly that major decisions will be made between a Myanmar and a Myanmar, and later these discussion will be expended to the ethnic forces for them to decide either to take it or leave it. This “carrot and stick tactic” denotes that a Myanmar does not treat a non-Myanmar as an equal but of a lower level people who are at their beck and call. Of course the democratic Myanmar will be magnanimous and on paper at least, will treat the ethnic races as equal. In other words, the ethnic groups will be at the whims and the fancy of the Myanmar leaders.

This has been the case since the inception of the Union of Burma when the Karens has no choice but were forced to fight. Then the Mon, Kachin, Shan, Karenni, Arakanese and Chin followed, not to mention the much smaller tribes as the Pa O, Palaung, Tavoynians Rohingys, etc . Today there is no single tribe or ethnic group that has not taken up arm or is still fighting against the Myanmar tribe. Burmese chauvinism and xenophobia run deep into their veins. Until and unless there is cetena, (goodwill) love and sincerity by the Myanmar towards the non Myanmar as showed by our beloved leader Bogyoke Aung San, we cannot visualize a final solution. The Panglong Agreement and the 1947 constitution drawn up under the supervision of Bogyoke Aung San has been trampled upon by the Burmese Tatmadaw belonging to the Myanmar tribe.

A barometer reading of the Junta’s current attitude towards the ethnic forces can be clearly seen in the military offensive against the Karens and the Shans. Their superb diplomacy of “divide and rule ” which translates into “let the ethnic forces fight the ethnic forces” e.g. Wa fighting the Shan, Karen Buddhist fighting the Karen Christians and so on, harkened back even to the Burmese democratic days when the Kachin and the Chins were recruited to fight the Karen. In fact it was the Chin forces that defended Rangoon from the Karen who were in the suburbs of Rangoon now called Insein. How many of the Chins and Kachins have laid down their lives in defense of the Union of Burma only to be changed to the chauvinism name of Myanmar. Currently how are the Chin and Kachin being treated? Do the Myanmar respect their culture and religious beliefs? How many times have the Myanmar negotiated with these ethnic groups and how many times have they betrayed or swindled them?

Of course there are several Myanmar who have not approved the proceedings of those in power. They have identified with the ethnic forces and fought shoulder to shoulder with their ethnic brethren, especially the students and the young generation who were forced to flee for their lives in 1988.. The ethnic groups welcomed them with open arms seeing theses young Myanmar like them being persecuted. This also proved that the ethnic groups are not at all racist but simply fighting the Junta and chauvinism. These Myanmar understand more about their ethnic brethren than those who are in Rangoon who are at the helm of the administration. Why are these Myanmar left out of the negotiations?

The treatment by the Myanmar of the non-Myanmar for half a century or so since the inception of modern Burma has guaranteed that no ethnic leader will trust the Myanmar. This is now being reinforced by the current “Secret Negotiations” which deliberately leave out the ethnic groups. Autonomous regions, self determination, and federalism are the words anathema to the Myanmar under the pretext of dismemberment the Union. But the fact is that these attitude covers up the truth, liberty, equality and fraternity.

The ethnic groups together with the people of Burma and the world have been left in the dark. Why? Is the fate of the 47 million Burmese people to be decided only by two persons alone, Khin Nyunt and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi? We have heard about the nature of these negotiation via foreign media only. No announcement or communique has been released. Naturally speculations are rife. Will the blood thirsty Narco- Generals be given impunity in return for an interim civilian government?

Not that we don’t have faith in Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Nor do we want revenge over the evil generals but the very fact that important conditions are agreed upon behind our backs indicate that the situation is equivalent to the Burmese saying, “Say Yar Thwa; Khaing Da Loke; Pyan Ma Pyaw Ne” meaning ‘go where you are directed and implement as told and don’t talk back’. Why is the culture of silence imposed on us? Is it a Myanmar way or a Myanmar mentality? We are very much bewildered. If we don’t know the causes, nature and extent of the gross violations of human rights which the Generals are still committing how can the truth be known, not to mention achieving of national reconciliation. We should also remember that the granting of de facto acceptance of impunity for those holding political, military or economic power erodes the very basis of the social order and helps to nurture a culture of violence.

Drawing from the experience of South Africa, it has been found that there is an existential need of the victim to break out of a situation of silence, isolation, fear and falsehood. To know the truth, to recover a shared memory and thus to restore human dignity for the victims and accountability for the perpetrators are MUSTS. We would very much like to find out or how whether this compatible with so called ‘Secret Negotiations’?

Without an intentional attempt to create a space where the stories of humiliation and suffering can be told, where the truth can emerge and collective remembrance restored, the search for justice will continue to divide the community rather than re-establish relationships and contribute to a process of healing. How can forced labour, forced relocation, systematic torture, disappearances, extra-judicial killing, raping of women and children continue even as the ‘Secret Negotiations’ are going on. Why have the Myanmar so stubbornly refused to learn the lessons of the recent past and all this continue to occur? More often than not, we hear the response, “Forget the past, the dead cannot come to life and turn your eyes to the future building of a nation.” This simplistic answer, so easily offered by those who have something to hide, has no healing power. It leaves no room for reconciliation. Until and unless the truth is told, unless the criminals are held accountable, or unless those directly responsible and their accomplice confess their guilt, ask for forgiveness and give concrete signs of repentance, there can be no justice and therefore no healing of society. No body in Burma would want to repeat the errors of the past, trapped in cycles of retributive violence. The people yearn for transformation. And this transformation could start with the opening up of the so called ‘Secret Negotiations’. The people of Burma including the ethnic groups have suffered too much from the unkept promises could be spared from experiencing evil wars and bitterness

THE UNKEPT PROMISES

Kanbawza Win

” Hope for the Best but Prepare for the Worst” is the unforgotten speech given by our beloved leader Bogyoke Aung San when he came to London to negotiate for independence of the Union of Burma. The speech implies that if we cannot achieve it by peaceful negotiations we will have to fight for it. Today this would also apply to all the ethnic forces in Burma who are at odds with the Burmese military Junta. Currently the secret negotiations between the pro democracy movement led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the military Junta has left out the ethnic forces. If the Myanmar race, both democratic and undemocratic forces construe the Non-Myanmar as an excess baggage that must be accepted as a necessary evil then the Burmese problem of will never be solved. Their actions seem to indicate a Burmese saying “Ka Lae Dwe Tait Tait Ne, Lu Gyi Dwe Sa Gar Pyaw Nae Dae” meaning, ‘Hey you little fellows keep quiet while we adult are seriously talking’. The nature of the so called ‘Secret Negotiations’ is a clear indication that there is something to hide from the public. If that is the case, then the ethnic groups will have to conclude that as the 1947 Constitution was torn up by the Burmese Junta in 1962 and obliterated up the Panglong Agreement then the ethnic groups have no obligation whatsoever to the Union. Hence fighting the Myanmar Tatmadaw (army) is amounted to legitimate war against an occupying force (for the past decade they have behave in such a manner) and cannot be construed as a civil war.

The very fact that the negotiations are bilateral and not tri-larteral underline the fact that the Myanmar tribe, which is a much stronger, more numerous and resourceful and dominating tribe, wants to rough ride shod over the ethnic groups. The writing on the wall exhibit clearly that major decisions will be made between a Myanmar and a Myanmar, and later these discussion will be expended to the ethnic forces for them to decide either to take it or leave it. This “carrot and stick tactic” denotes that a Myanmar does not treat a non-Myanmar as an equal but of a lower level people who are at their beck and call. Of course the democratic Myanmar will be magnanimous and on paper at least, will treat the ethnic races as equal. In other words, the ethnic groups will be at the whims and the fancy of the Myanmar leaders.

This has been the case since the inception of the Union of Burma when the Karens has no choice but were forced to fight. Then the Mon, Kachin, Shan, Karenni, Arakanese and Chin followed, not to mention the much smaller tribes as the Pa O, Palaung, Tavoynians Rohingys, etc . Today there is no single tribe or ethnic group that has not taken up arm or is still fighting against the Myanmar tribe. Burmese chauvinism and xenophobia run deep into their veins. Until and unless there is cetena, (goodwill) love and sincerity by the Myanmar towards the non Myanmar as showed by our beloved leader Bogyoke Aung San, we cannot visualize a final solution. The Panglong Agreement and the 1947 constitution drawn up under the supervision of Bogyoke Aung San has been trampled upon by the Burmese Tatmadaw belonging to the Myanmar tribe.

A barometer reading of the Junta’s current attitude towards the ethnic forces can be clearly seen in the military offensive against the Karens and the Shans. Their superb diplomacy of “divide and rule ” which translates into “let the ethnic forces fight the ethnic forces” e.g. Wa fighting the Shan, Karen Buddhist fighting the Karen Christians and so on, harkened back even to the Burmese democratic days when the Kachin and the Chins were recruited to fight the Karen. In fact it was the Chin forces that defended Rangoon from the Karen who were in the suburbs of Rangoon now called Insein. How many of the Chins and Kachins have laid down their lives in defense of the Union of Burma only to be changed to the chauvinism name of Myanmar. Currently how are the Chin and Kachin being treated? Do the Myanmar respect their culture and religious beliefs? How many times have the Myanmar negotiated with these ethnic groups and how many times have they betrayed or swindled them?

Of course there are several Myanmar who have not approved the proceedings of those in power. They have identified with the ethnic forces and fought shoulder to shoulder with their ethnic brethren, especially the students and the young generation who were forced to flee for their lives in 1988.. The ethnic groups welcomed them with open arms seeing theses young Myanmar like them being persecuted. This also proved that the ethnic groups are not at all racist but simply fighting the Junta and chauvinism. These Myanmar understand more about their ethnic brethren than those who are in Rangoon who are at the helm of the administration. Why are these Myanmar left out of the negotiations?

The treatment by the Myanmar of the non-Myanmar for half a century or so since the inception of modern Burma has guaranteed that no ethnic leader will trust the Myanmar. This is now being reinforced by the current “Secret Negotiations” which deliberately leave out the ethnic groups. Autonomous regions, self determination, and federalism are the words anathema to the Myanmar under the pretext of dismemberment the Union. But the fact is that these attitude covers up the truth, liberty, equality and fraternity.

The ethnic groups together with the people of Burma and the world have been left in the dark. Why? Is the fate of the 47 million Burmese people to be decided only by two persons alone, Khin Nyunt and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi? We have heard about the nature of these negotiation via foreign media only. No announcement or communique has been released. Naturally speculations are rife. Will the blood thirsty Narco- Generals be given impunity in return for an interim civilian government?

Not that we don’t have faith in Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Nor do we want revenge over the evil generals but the very fact that important conditions are agreed upon behind our backs indicate that the situation is equivalent to the Burmese saying, “Say Yar Thwa; Khaing Da Loke; Pyan Ma Pyaw Ne” meaning ‘go where you are directed and implement as told and don’t talk back’. Why is the culture of silence imposed on us? Is it a Myanmar way or a Myanmar mentality? We are very much bewildered. If we don’t know the causes, nature and extent of the gross violations of human rights which the Generals are still committing how can the truth be known, not to mention achieving of national reconciliation. We should also remember that the granting of de facto acceptance of impunity for those holding political, military or economic power erodes the very basis of the social order and helps to nurture a culture of violence.

Drawing from the experience of South Africa, it has been found that there is an existential need of the victim to break out of a situation of silence, isolation, fear and falsehood. To know the truth, to recover a shared memory and thus to restore human dignity for the victims and accountability for the perpetrators are MUSTS. We would very much like to find out or how whether this compatible with so called ‘Secret Negotiations’?

Without an intentional attempt to create a space where the stories of humiliation and suffering can be told, where the truth can emerge and collective remembrance restored, the search for justice will continue to divide the community rather than re-establish relationships and contribute to a process of healing. How can forced labour, forced relocation, systematic torture, disappearances, extra-judicial killing, raping of women and children continue even as the ‘Secret Negotiations’ are going on. Why have the Myanmar so stubbornly refused to learn the lessons of the recent past and all this continue to occur? More often than not, we hear the response, “Forget the past, the dead cannot come to life and turn your eyes to the future building of a nation.” This simplistic answer, so easily offered by those who have something to hide, has no healing power. It leaves no room for reconciliation. Until and unless the truth is told, unless the criminals are held accountable, or unless those directly responsible and their accomplice confess their guilt, ask for forgiveness and give concrete signs of repentance, there can be no justice and therefore no healing of society. No body in Burma would want to repeat the errors of the past, trapped in cycles of retributive violence. The people yearn for transformation. And this transformation could start with the opening up of the so called ‘Secret Negotiations’. The people of Burma including the ethnic groups have suffered too much from the unkept promises could be spared from experiencing evil wars and bitterness

Salai Bawi Lian Mang
Chinland Guardian
December 10, 2003

It is undeniable historical fact that, we, the people of Union of Burma, have had a very bitter experience during the Burmese General’s homegrown Burmese Way of Socialism that led Burma from riches to rags. And it seems that we are now heading for another General’s homegrown Burmese Way of Democracy.
After General Khin Ngunt announced his seven points political roadmap to democracy in August 2003; “The Leaders welcomed the recent positive developments in Myanmar…” was a statement made by the Association for Southeast East Asian Nations (ASEAN) at their 9th summit in Bali in October.

How can one possibly say that the actions of Burmese military junta are “positive” while the junta threatened the life of Aung San Suu Kyi and putting her under strict house arrest, detained and tortured thousands of democracy activists, and persists in persecuting religious and ethnic minorities around the country.

In reality, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) is replicating the methods practiced by its predecessor, General Ne Win. The resemblance of the present military junta to their predecessor Gen. Ne Win’s rule is even more pronounced when Khin Ngunt, the notorious Burmese military intelligence chief turned Prime Minister, announced his political roadmap to democracy without mentioning any time frame and ignoring the role of ethnic nationalities and winners of the 1990 general election in Burma.

In spite of the junta’s claimed that they are working towards transforming Burma into disciplined democratic country, the junta’s Generals’ home grown democracy seems to follow neither the Westminster nor the United States presidency model. It seems the Generals are pushing the country towards a Burmese version of democracy that will only continue the legacy left by General Ne Win’s brand “Burmese Way of Socialism”, which railroaded Burma from its position as the “rice bowl of Asia” to that of a United Nations’ Least Developed Country (LDC).

In 1962, General Ne Win staged a coup, justifying the move he had done by saying that he saved the country from the brink of disintegration. The General discarded the 1947 constitution and ruled the country in the name of the Revolutionary Council, without a constitution or legislative body, for twelve years.

In the early 1970s, Gen. Ne Win called for advises in preparation of a new constitution. The People of the Chin ethnicity, along with many people both Burmans and non-Burmans, presented their sincere input to the General, suggesting that Burma is best suited with federal system based on democracy and ethnic equality. Unfortunately, those who proposed a federal system based on democratic principle and ethnic equality were sent to jail. According to the then Revolutionary Council, the federalists are a danger to ethnic integration of the country.

While locking up those who advocated for federalism based on ethnic equality behind bars, Gen. Ne Win pushed a referendum on his proposed Burmese brand of socialism. It was not surprising that his proposal received a 90 percent approval, according to the Burmese Socialist Program Party (BSPP).

According to the 1974 constitution, the BSPP then became the only legitimate political party in the country. No other political party was allowed to form. Further more, the youth wing called “Lanzin lu nge” (a youth program equal to the red guard of China under Chairman Mao Tze-Dong) was created by the BSPP. Under the BSPP one- party rule, every student was compelled to join “Lanzin Lu Nge” and the main goal of “Lanzin lu nge,”, is to support BSPP in every aspects.

Gen. Ne Win used the new constitution and the referendum as a platform for legitimacy for his dictatorship.  After the new constitution was adopted in 1974, Gen. Ne Win shake off his military uniform and preferred to be rule and call as “Mr. President” or “Mr. Chairman”. Whether he takes the post of president or the chairman of the BSPP party according to his will, he remains the main arbiter of power in Burma politics.

Comparably, the present military junta in Burma staged a coup, by killing thousands of peaceful demonstrators in 1988. The coup’s leaders claimed that they had saved the country from the brink of anarchy, and they nullified the 1974 constitution. Even though they allowed political parties to form, including the National League for Democracy (NLD), the junta refused to transfer power to the winning party of 1990 election which the military government themselves has held.

Echoes of the “Lanzin lu nge” are cropping up as well.  The formation and functioning of Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), who carryout the ambushed of Aung San Suu Kyi in May, 2004 and forcibly rallied the civilians in supports of “Khin Ngunt’s political roadmap”, is exactly the same as that of the “Lanzin lu nge” during Ne Win era.

Now, after fifteen years of ruling the country without any constitution or legislative body, Gen. Khin Ngunt comes up with seven points, including national convention that will be followed by drafting a new constitution and referendum, political road map to democracy. No body knows how long it will take to reach the stage of that seventh point, when Burma will ostensibly become the world’s most disciplined democratic country.

There was a time when the strongman of Burma, Gen. Ne Win used the new constitution and referendum as a stage to shake off his military uniform in order to gain legitimacy for one party dictatorship rule and drive the country straight to United Nations’ LDC member with Burmese Ways of Socialism till he was ousted by the popular uprising in 1988.

Likewise, the present military junta’s leaders Gen. Khin Ngunt and Gen. Than Shwe version of national convention with it’s handpicks delegations that will be followed by drafting of the country’s new constitution and national referendum seems to be replicating the Ne Win version of drafting a new constitution and national referendum that pave the way for legitimacy to General Ne Win’s one party BSPP dictatorship rule.

It is obvious that the present military junta is exactly copying their predecessor Gen. Ne Win system by proposing the national convention and a new constitution to gain legitimacy for the military rule in order to transform Burma into the world’s “most discipline democratic country” – led and strong armed by a ruthless military. That the military will play the main arbiter of power in the country and every movement of the citizens will be closely watched, and they will call it the Burmese Way of Democracy.

By Salai Za Ceu Lian
Chinland Guardian

May 9, 2004: Even if the military generals implement the process of constitution in their sponsored convention by compelling the participants to approve it, we are not going to accept the outcomes as the would-be-seen result is illegal.   Indeed, convening the national convention without finding means first to end the internal political crisis is disgraceful and unacceptable agenda that the military regime is embarking on. It is just a FAKE convention.

The idea in behind is a mere illusion of introducing a sweeping reform. It will neither produce concrete results benefiting the country’s political future nor will it pave ways to bring about positive changes politically, which would lead towards reinstating democratic process. The sole purpose of the upcoming national convention slated on May 17,2004 by thuggish regime is to legalize the militarism and defend dictatorial rule through the Constitution.

Once again, they are masterminding the participants in coming convention to nullify the legitimate role of the winning party (NLD) and 1990 election result, which they, the generals, themselves organized it.  Strictly speaking, their move with the proposed convention is purely a flagrant breach of the 1990s election outcome and its legitimacy.  Before Burma holds the presidency of ASEAN in 2006, the Burmese Generals are attempting to make sure that their draft constitution is fully completed. Unfortunately, the Secretary general of United Nations, Mr. Kofi Annan’s expectation to see Burma’s democratic government in the year 2006 would be the year for ASEAN countries to officially recognize the bloody Burmese military regime by empowering them to chair the ASEAN.

By looking at the real challenges facing the country politically at this critical juncture, one could easily draw a conclusion that convening a national convention so as to deal with the Constitution is not first priority for leaders who are in power to work on it. While hundreds of thousands of political dissidents are in notorious prisons throughout Burma’s jails and even the leader of a legitimate NLD Party, Daw Suu, herself is under house detention, the spiraling notion of pushing the agenda ahead to hold national convention is both primary silliness and vicious act of military leaders.  Violations of human rights have been unabated in countryside. Beside this, Professor Pinheiro, Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Burma was flatly refused to continue his fact-finding mission inside the country.  

If the dictators are sincerely committed to working towards transition of democracy and handing over power to the winning party where the legitimate power is belonged, they must first start holding a genuine dialogue and not kind of previous talk or so-called confidence building that resulted in vague two years ago. They must together work in consultation with the legitimate body in accordance with internationally accpeted norms.  

Unfortunately, the proposed convention is a series attempt by the brutal regime to continue the old-fashioned National Concention, which was discontinued in 1996.  With respect to the current convention, no sign is indicated from generals that they are going to abandon the six points guideline and 104 points article. No statement is made regarding the freedom of expression for the participants in National Convention to freely share their beliefs and that their expressed concerns be taken into consideration. If the convention is to be convened jointly by winning party- NLD and SPDC, we might have to wait and expect positive outcomes.

However, as the present convention is the one an illegal regime has one-sidedly called and going to dictate it, we, as democrats, both inside and outside the country must denounce it.  Untill and unless the regime takes decisive and concrete actions toward handing over political power to the election-winning party and allow all the political parties to freely continue their political activism, there is nothing that we can say about the regime’s committment to a real political reform. Just releasing one or two political prisoners is not a good sign or positive steps either. But this rather is a considerable evidence to suggest that dictators are trying to deceive international community especially western powers so that the imposed sanction against dictators which affects and poses a major challenge to their regime be lifted.

Despite seeing the political plot of regime with their fake Convention now, to me, it would be so inappropriate and even naïve for all the handpicked invitees to attend the coming convention.They all should be convinced that they are now hijacked by the authoritarian regime to make the military rule legal in order to perpetuate the military rule. At this point, the invitees should refuse to toe the line of the military generals. Now is the high time for a pure and genuine gold to shine.  To make it clear here, all the potential invitees to attend a fake national convention must oppose the convention by strongly siding with Daw Suu and her legitimate Party.

By Chin Forum Working Group I
Constitution Drafting Committee
To view the full text please go to www.chinforum.org

A.     Reunification of Union of Burma as a Federal Union

The constituent units of the Union under the Constitution of Union of Burma at present can choose to reform the Union if the 1947 Constitution of the Union is readopted with amendments according to the core of the Panglong Agreement to unite and cooperate in their common interest, and give the right of self determination to all the units as demanded by their distinct natures.

All the democratic forces of the Union are to uphold the generally accepted principle that, “A nation is said to be a group of people who agree to live together in voluntary association”. The association must be voluntary, and not forced, to form a real nation. Voluntary association can only arise among peoples who have confidence in one another and who feel that, by living together, they have much to gain and little if anything to lose, that thereby their welfare and progress will be helped and not thwarted. So if the SLORC /SPDC is trying to conquer the will of the peoples by force of arms, intimidation, and deception, it will just make the people increase the hatred they have for them.

Even if the SLORC/SPDC could successfully conquer them by force of arms today, the spirit to escape from their brutal bondage will always be smoldering, which means that there will be no peace in the country. The constituent units of any countries who have been conquered by force of arms, in fake union founded by force of arms against the voluntary will of the constituent units, usually keep on struggling in cold or hot war till the opportunity arises when the oppressors become weak, and on the day when the iron grip of the oppressors is weak, which almost surely happens at some time, the situation usually ends with chaos and bloodshed.

In this way a country ruled by force of arms against the voluntary will of the constituent units and the people will never have peace. This is just the way things are now in the Union of Burma, and have been for a half century by now, dragging down the country into the condition of the poorest country in the world with all kinds of suffering and misery in spite of the richness of its natural resource; for, all money to be invested for the development of the country has been spent only for arms and ammunition and other military purposes by the successive despotic military regimes to oppress and kill their own citizens.

Thus the only way of solving the political crisis in the Union of Burma will be to strictly observe the natural course of democratic legal phenomena, which can be accomplished only by handing over power peacefully to the elected representatives elected in the last 1990 May general election, who will in turn proclaim the re-adoption of the 1947 Union Constitution with its amendments to federal form to bridge the gap between the period of democracy, defunct since 1962, and the future.

Then only will the people of the Union be able to pursue in freedom — freedom from fear and freedom from want – the cultural richness and many-colored variety of their land, beautifying their part of the world and playing their parts on the stage of the world with pride and dignity, recreating all that has been lost under the bondage of militarism.

B. The basic grounds on which Federal Union of Burma may be reunited         

The universal practice of equality according to the principles of democracy anywhere in the world is universal adult suffrage, no matter how different those adults are in size, in gender, status or other distinctions amongst persons. This principle is also applied to nations and States, as they are also corporate personal entities.
This is the reason why nations large and small have equal rights and have equal numbers of representatives in the General Assembly of the United Nations. It is the same reason why the constituent unit states, large and small, of many sizes in population and geographical territory in a country have equal representatives as in the Senate of the United States of America and in the legislatures of many other countries.
William Peterson, a representative of New Jersey (USA) was quoted as saying, “What, Pray, is representation founded on Numbers? If State Sovereignty is to be kept up, shall I submit the welfare of New Jersey with five votes in a council where Virginia has sixteen? This would lead to Autocracy. Neither my State nor myself will ever submit to despotism or to tyranny”.

Thus the signing of the Panglong Agreement by all the signatory nationalities and the several agreements that have been signed since then among the constituent nationalities of the Union have made this universal fundamental principle of democracy applicable to the signatory nationalities of the Agreement and other recognized nationalities of the Union large and small, no matter what their respective differences in geographical and population size within the Union.

Therefore all the national states in the Union shall have equal representatives and equal votes in the national convention and in the constitutional assembly and in at least one chamber of legislature, which has more power in the federal legislation of the Union. Then only can all the nationalities in the Union be united according to the generally accepted theory of voluntary association mentioned above.

Actually, a constitution is not an ordinary piece of legislation. Instead it is a sacred document and it is an agreement to live together. It cannot be compared to any ordinary law. So the practice of adopting a constitution by referendum is not fair, as it is not as simple as asking the people to give an answer of ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to such a comprehensive document.

It is therefore essential that the constitution of the union should be adopted and amended by equal representatives popularly elected to the constitutional assembly by each of all the national states of the Union, respectively, to be just and fair to all of them. It is this concept, which should be enshrined together with democracy and self-determination in the constitution of the federal Union of Burma in which Chinland is to be a constituent unit, to guide us in freedom to carry out the task of continually increasing the prosperity and development of Chinland and its population.

That is, adoption and amendment of the constitution of the union should be decided on the basis of a majority of individual national states and not by on that of the total population of the union. Thus the conditions expressed here are the only favorable condition for joining the reunification of the Federal Union of Burma.

C. Government formation systems and Chinland constitution.  

Building a sovereign nation or sovereign state always involves the constitutional law of that nation or state. It is constitutional law, which create the constitution of a nation or state. There are so many assertions on what constitution of a nation is. The statement on it, which seems to be the easiest to understand, is “A constitution may be said to be a collection of principles according to which powers of the government, the rights of the governed, and the relations between the two are adjusted”.

So in building a nation the most important function of the nation is to make those principles usually known as the constitution and the laws of the country concerned. The principles mentioned above are commonly embodied in an established Legislature, Executive and Judiciary. Those who make laws are representatives usually known as the Legislature elected by the people. Those laws passed by the legislature are enforced by an executive body usually known as Government. Whether the government executes the laws as passed by the Legislature is decided by the Judiciary whenever there arise legal problems in the courts.

Generally speaking, constitutions are classified as being of either the unitary system or the federal system. Constitutions in which unitary system is used are common in countries where there is only one sovereign government. It is adopted mainly in countries where the citizens are similar people of the same culture and language in which only one government can treat the citizens as only one kind of people.

Federal systems of constitution are also used, however, even in countries of the same language and culture, if the country is too vast in area to be controlled from one central government. The Federal system necessarily involves decentralization of the sovereign power of the country or nation concerned. The Federal is most to be pursued by people with different languages and cultures in different territories, which can agree to form a central government to share the same administration only in their common cause and interest, though each territory keeps its own sovereign government for its internal affairs.

In forming the Executive or government of a country, there are several forms of government mainly presidential system of government and parliamentary system of government no matter it be unitary or federal system of constitution. In the presidential form of government, the President (the Head of State and Chief Executive of Government) is in general supposed to be elected by the majority votes of adult population of the whole country. The President selected his secretaries with the consent of the legislature. The power is in the head of the state — but the people in presidential system have a wide range of executive discretion.

In the Parliamentary system of government, the Legislature elects a Prime Minister by majority votes of the members of Legislature and the Prime Minister selects ministers in consultation with the members of Legislature. Actually, the leader of the political party, which wins the majority of seats in the Legislature usually, forms the government with selected members of the party in power.            

The President in the parliamentary system is a nominal head of state elected by the legislature or presidential electoral committee. The President acts according to the advice of the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister acts only in the name of the President. In the same way, a governor of a member state acts according to the advice of the Chief Minister and the Chief Minister acts in the name of governor. In the parliamentary system of government, the power is in the population, but the central government or the state government has a wide range of executive discretion.

There is also a dual system- the combination of  the two systems, practiced by some countries like Pakistan, France and Russia. The President is very powerful here. The Prime minister is responsible to the President. That is the Prime Minister and his/her Ministers hold their posts at the discretion of the President.  The constitution of the future federal Uninon of Burma is being suggested to be in this dual system by the Chin Forum as it seems to balance the minority rights and the minority rights of the Union constituent states in a condition where the size of one state and the other is in differences in the size of population as well as in geographical area.

To make it more understandable, the function of the president and the prime minister of a state is roughly and generally comparable to the function of President and Secretary in an organization. Many of us have had experiences in one or more of such organizations. The President of a country performs functions performed by the Chairman or President of an organization and Prime Minister is just carrying out the function of the secretary in an organization. The Prime Minister is like the General Secretary and his ministers are like under-secretaries in an organization. So in an organization, some time the general secretary has the power and the Chairman or the President follows the plan of the general secretary.

The constitution of Federal Union of Burma will be a federal constitution. But the Chinland constitution has to be a unitary constitution, with several local areas having autonomous decision powers in some cases. How to form the authority in the districts and their power may be enacted into law by the Chinland Legislative Assembly. Or it may be in federal form which we need to consider any one of which will fit us best. The Chinland constitution here has not been well arranged yet though the idea also is to be in federal form too.

Adopting presidential system of government in the constitution of Federal Union of Burma is regarded by some people to be out of question owing to the vastness of the country with the very poor and from one of the constituent peoples hold that office who is inherently prejudiced against other constituent peoples of the country — a situation that has been experienced in Burma in the past and exists there to this day.

That also is a reason why parliamentary system of government is to be adopted in the union, so that the people have the sovereign power and not the government. Anyhow, there are people who still advocate the presidential system of government for the federal Union of Burma with the idea that true federal form can only be instituted in this way. So let us all think it over.

But to adopt presidential system of government for the Chinland government is quite a considerable step. If we adopt the presidential system of government, the head of the State or the governor of the state will be elected by the whole adult population of the Chinland and the Governor is to select the secretaries with the consent of the legislative assembly of the Chinland.  The presidential system of government is more or less adopted in this draft.

In this way, since, the whole adult population is to elect a governor, and there is a greater and better chance of electing the most qualifie d and most popular person in the whole state. In the same way, the elected governor might have more sense for the equal treatment of all the tribes and sections of the Chin people in consideration of the support of every section of the residents of the Chinland. In this way there can be fairness and unity to solve the many differences we could possibly have.

But in some way, there is some danger to be apprehended. That is, if a very irresponsible person is elected, the governor could easily abuse his power and it will be not easy to control him by impeachment or otherwise after he is duly in full power. We have to keep in mind some of the bygone Chin leaders who often were accused of localism and nepotism.

Thus on the basis of the arguments and evidence given above in Volume I, Part I to Part II, the Framework of the Chinland constitution in the Volume II of this Paper is tentatively proposed as a menu to be discussed and to provoke the interest of everyone who has any interest in the matter to respond with suggestions, feedback and advice.

In short, our conclusion will include the following terms of reference:

The Chinland constitution is not to be a rigid one, but a flexible one.

It will be a constitution, which will promote democracy and freedom.

It should be based on dialectal or geographical or traditional jurisdictions in our society.

It should be the constitution of the state, which will be a constituent state in the federal Union that might be called Federal Union of Burma.

It should be a unitary form of constitution with several local areas having autonomous decision in some cases.

A Presidential system or a Parliamentary system of government may be adopted but the presidential system of government is more or less adopted in this draft.

To protect and promote human rights and democratic principles